Louisiana Law Review
Volume 75 | Number 1
Fall 2014

Binding Future Selves
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura

Repository Citation
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Binding Future Selves, 75 La. L. Rev. (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol75/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Binding Future Selves
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura∗
ABSTRACT
Courts traditionally treat a person entering an agreement as the
same person at the time of enforcement notwithstanding the passage of
time or an intervening change of mind. For certain agreements
between intimates, however, courts have adopted the novel view that
the enforcement of a person’s earlier commitment would improperly
constrain that person’s will rather than serve as an expression of it.
These cases rest on the assumption that an intervening change has
created meaningful—and legally significant—differences between the
later self (at the time of enforcement) and the earlier self (at the time of
commitment) and that the later self deserves protection from the
earlier self’s choices.
This “different selves” rationale has arisen primarily in the
context of agreements pertaining to matters such as embryo
disposition, surrogacy, and parentage. Courts and commentators
appear to believe that the centrality of these types of choices to
personhood justifies exceptions to general contract principles. But
even assuming that choices of this sort differ from choices embodied in
“normal” contracts, the different selves rationale does not provide a
principled basis for resolving a dispute between the selves; it does not
explain why a choice central to personhood made at an earlier time is
less central to that person than a choice made at a later time.
This Article contributes to the existing literature on several fronts.
It reveals the increasing adoption by courts of the different selves
rationale, which, until recently, was thought to be merely theoretical.
It also exposes the ungrounded assumptions on which the rationale
rests: that it applies only to a certain set of choices, that it can identify
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the proper choices to protect, and that it can actually protect those
choices. Finally, this Article uses the different selves rationale as an
occasion to examine the role of personal identity in contract law.
Theories of personal identity emphasize the importance of selfcontinuity and future-regarding action, both of which are disserved by
an approach that prizes a person’s preference at the time of dispute
rather than her earlier commitment.
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INTRODUCTION
The law of contracts is not sympathetic to regret. Indeed, the
enforcement of commitments even after a promisor has come to
regret her promises has been called “the very essence of contract.”1
On certain matters of great personal significance, however, courts
have second-guessed this well-established principle.
A.Z. v. B.Z., which involved a couple’s fifteen-year saga to
have biologically related children, exemplifies this departure.2 For
the first two years of their marriage, the couple experienced
difficulty conceiving a child, and when the wife conceived, she
suffered an ectopic pregnancy that necessitated the removal of one
of her fallopian tubes.3 Eight years passed during which the couple
participated in a year’s worth of additional fertility treatments
without success. Eleven years into their marriage, the couple
turned to Gamete Inter-Fallopian Transfer—the simultaneous
transfer of removed eggs and sperm into the fallopian tube—but
this procedure resulted in a second ectopic pregnancy, destroying
the wife’s remaining fallopian tube.4 Left with few other options,
the couple decided to pursue parenthood through in vitro
fertilization.5
Before the first of their procedures, the fertility clinic presented the
couple with a form entitled “Consent Form for Freezing
(Cryopreservation) of Embryos,” on which they were asked to indicate
the disposition of leftover frozen embryos upon certain listed
contingencies, including separation or death.6 The form prompted the
couple to select the options “donated” or “destroyed,” but it also
provided a blank line on which the couple could specify other
1. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract,
84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1247 (1998). See also Marjorie Maguire Shultz,
Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 204, 214 (1982) (observing that the “freedom to pursue individualization
and diversity that characterizes private ordering” involves “yesterday’s legally
binding private choice . . . overrid[ing] today’s contrary private choice”).
2. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1052–53 (Mass. 2000).
3. Id. at 1052, 1052 n.6 (explaining that an ectopic pregnancy is one that
occurs outside the uterus).
4. Id. at 1053.
5. Id. The in vitro fertilization process includes the extraction of eggs from
the intended mother, fertilization of eggs in a laboratory, implantation of one or
more of the resulting embryos, and cryopreservation of any leftover embryos for
later use. See id.
6. Id. at 1053–54. Specifically, the form listed the contingencies of “wife
or donor reaching normal menopause or age forty-five years; preembryos no
longer being healthy; one of us dying; [s]hould we become separated;” and
“[s]hould we both die.” Id. at 1054 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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preferences.7 For the contingency, “‘[s]hould we become
separated,’” the wife, in the presence of her husband, wrote that the
embryos should be “‘return[ed] to [the] wife for implant,’” and she
and her husband signed the form.8 That first procedure was
unsuccessful, but the couple tried several more times, with the
husband signing a blank consent form thereafter and the wife
filling out the form with identical language regarding their
preferences in the event of their separation.9 Finally, three years
later, the wife conceived and gave birth to twins.10 When the
couple divorced several years after the twins’ birth, the wife sought
judicial enforcement of the consent form over her husband’s
objection in order to gain possession of the remaining four
embryos for her use. The court held that under the circumstances,
the parties did not enter into a binding agreement.11 Remarkably,
however, the court stated that “even had the husband and the wife
entered into an unambiguous agreement between themselves
regarding the disposition of the frozen preembryos, [the court]
would not enforce an agreement that would compel one donor to
become a parent against his or her will.”12
By basing its decision on a disjunction between the husband’s will
at the time of the legal dispute and his will memorialized in the earlier
agreement, the court’s reasoning represents a novel departure from
conventional contract principles. Contract law usually treats an
agreement as the relevant manifestation of the will of the contracting
parties and the resultant source of legal authority.13 In determining the
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1053.
11. See id. at 1056–57 (noting that the record did not indicate that the
parties intended the form to act as a binding agreement between them, as
opposed to an agreement between them and the clinic; that the form lacked a
duration provision, leading to the possibility of changed circumstances; and that
the phrase, “‘[s]hould we become separated,’” did not necessarily apply to a
divorce proceeding). Other courts, interpreting similar consent forms, have
concluded that the forms were definite enough to constitute an agreement
between the spouses. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Iowa
2003) (treating the consent form as an otherwise binding agreement but
invalidating it on public policy grounds); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180
(N.Y. 1998) (enforcing a consent form as a binding agreement between the
spouses).
12. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057 (emphasis added).
13. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Preface to FAULT IN
AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW xi (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat eds., 2010);
Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1727 (2008) (observing that contract law may be
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scope of the parties’ legal obligations, courts look to the parties’ assent
at the time of the agreement and not afterwards: “The time for
measuring a ‘meeting of the minds’ is the point of agreement, not
performance.”14 Along those lines, courts interpret the agreement by
determining the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract
was created, not at some other time.15 In short, rights and obligations
typically arise from a party’s acts at the time of contracting; the law
regularly allows the contracting self to bind his future self.
Intervening events, like a key individual’s death or the destruction
of a specific thing necessary for performance, sometimes excuse
performance under the doctrine of impracticability.16 But such events
cannot do so if they were objectively foreseeable at the time of
contracting.17 The A.Z. court did not rely on the occurrence of
unforeseen circumstances or mistaken assumptions by the husband
about the state of affairs. Indeed, it would have been difficult for the
husband to argue that the couple’s separation was an unforeseen
circumstance that relieved him of his commitment to surrender the
frozen embryos to his wife given that the spouses indicated their
preferences for the disposition of the embryos if that very contingency
arose.18

understood as an “act of self-legislation in which the parties create new legal
obligations for themselves”).
14. Vaughan v. Tetzlaff, 446 A.2d 356, 358 (Vt. 1982). See also Situation
Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Malouf, Inc., 724 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Mass. 2000) (noting that
“to create an enforceable contract, there must be agreement between the parties
on the material terms of that contract, and the parties must have a present
intention to be bound by that agreement” (emphasis added)).
15. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990);
Evans v. Famous Music Corp., 807 N.E.2d 869, 872 (N.Y. 2004) (“It is well
settled that our role in interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intention of the
parties at the time they entered into the contract.”); Planters Gin Co. v. Fed.
Compress & Warehouse Co., 78 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tenn. 2002) (“The central
tenet of contract construction is that the intent of the contracting parties at the
time of executing the agreement should govern.”). This inquiry is primarily
objective, focusing on the words and conduct of the parties rather than their
subjective intentions. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory
of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 427
(2000).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261 (excusing
performance due to unanticipated impracticability), 265 (excusing performance
due to unanticipated frustration of purpose) (1981).
17. See, e.g., Karl Wendt Farm Equip. Co. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 931 F.2d
1112, 1120 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that the doctrines of impracticability and
frustration of purpose are “meant to fairly apportion risks between the parties in
light of unforeseen circumstances”).
18. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (Mass. 2000).

76

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

The A.Z. court’s decision to protect the husband from his
subsequent, internal change of mind joins several other recent
cases—involving agreements regarding the use of assisted
reproductive technologies, parentage, and custody—in which
courts have acted as if the person who made the promise is
different in a legally significant way from the person against whom
it is asserted such that enforcement would now be improper.19 I
call this novel defense to contract enforcement the “different selves
rationale.”20
By questioning the legitimacy of holding a later self to an
earlier self’s commitments, courts have introduced skepticism about
personal identity—how different selves connect over time, and
whether a person remains the same despite inevitable changes that
unfold21—into the realm of contract law. The acknowledgement of
temporally different selves has significant implications for contract
law in that it suggests a potentially potent reason not to hold a party to
her earlier promises. Even more broadly, it challenges the ability of
the law in multiple contexts to allocate benefits and impose
punishment based on past actions. If differences between the selves
are significant enough to relieve a person from her contractual
commitments, similar differences may call into question the
legitimacy of punishment for criminal acts committed by a former
self. And what justifies paternalistic interventions—like anti19. See infra Part I.C.
20. As I have noted in previous work, courts historically resisted enforcing
intimate agreements based on traditional notions of family and gender that have
begun to sound off-tune to modern ears. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public
Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 159, 177–90 (2013)
(criticizing a wide range of public policy rationales for non-enforcement). It is
therefore possible that these courts have merely sought to dress up old public
policy objections to the enforcement of intimate agreements in a more palatable
package. It may also be the case that courts are actually uncertain about their
authority to compel specific performance of acts called for by the agreements.
See infra note 96 and accompanying text. At the risk of speculating about buried
motives that will never come to light, see Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing
Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107
YALE L.J. 1885, 1888 (1998) (“[C]ases unfortunately offer quite limited insight
into the subjective motivations of their cast of characters.”); it is therefore
possible that the courts’ motivations reside not only in protecting the parties’
later selves from their earlier choices, but also in some other place. But the fact
remains that courts have at least nominally advanced a novel justification for
refusing to enforce agreements that deserves examination on its own terms. And
I will argue that, if anything, a more plausible explanation for the different
selves rationale is not the desire to disguise old public policies as much as it is
the courts’ legitimate confusion about the prospect of enforcing personhooddefining commitments against later selves. Id. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part I.A.
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smoking ordinances—designed to make someone better off in the
future? To recognize legally significant differences between the
selves, as the courts adopting the different selves rationale have
done, is to acknowledge the limits of the law to hold people
accountable for their actions over time.
The fact that the different selves rationale has thus far only
arisen in the context of intimate agreements suggests that the
personhood-related aspects of the choices at stake, like becoming a
legal or genetic parent, justify the exceptional treatment of intimate
agreements.22 The rationale for holding that the earlier self cannot
bind the later self therefore has its roots in notions about what
choices are central to personhood. In adopting a rationale that
justifies non-enforcement based on differences between the selves,
however, courts confuse questions of personhood with questions of
personal identity. Questions of connection and persistence between
past and present selves, which relate to personal identity, are
conceptually distinct from questions about the centrality of past
and present choices to the self and how the law should protect
those choices.
A quick example illustrates this distinction. Which expression
of B.Z.’s will regarding use of the cryopreserved embryos is more
central to personhood: the earlier commitment he made to his wife
that she could use the embryos if they separated, or his later desire that
they be destroyed? The different selves rationale does not provide a
reason to privilege the later preference over the earlier one given that
the choices at both moments—involving reproduction—seem equally
central to personhood. Courts embracing the different selves rationale
clearly believe that the preference at the time of enforcement is the
party’s “true” preference, making enforcement of the earlier
preference impermissible. But they offer no theoretical justification for
this approach. This lack of justification is especially pressing because
the adoption of an ex post perspective defeats the expectations of one
of the parties to the agreement and may also limit the ability of all
others to make important ex ante choices—like becoming parents
through the use of assisted reproductive technologies—in future
cases.
Only a few years before the A.Z. v. B.Z. case, E. Allan
Farnsworth observed that internal changes almost never persuade
courts to grant relief from earlier commitments, even when those

22. The A.Z. court, for example, expressly referred to the choices at issue as
pertaining to “personal rights of . . . delicate and intimate character.” A.Z., 725
N.E.2d at 1059 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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changes make one feel like a different person.23 He spoke too soon.
The emergence of the different selves rationale poses the vexing
question whether and in what circumstances differences within the
same person over time may prevent a person from binding his
future self. And the different selves rationale answers that at least
within the context of certain agreements regarding intimate subject
matter, changes of preference over time can relieve a person of her
contractual obligations.
My thesis is that theories of personal identity render the
different selves rationale incorrect on both counts. In so arguing, I
provide an extended analysis of the concept of personal identity in
the contract law context.24 Although the subject of personal
identity has generated a lively scholarly debate outside the legal
academy, legal scholars have largely ignored its role in contract
law. I use existing theories of personal identity to examine and
resist the assumptions about self-discontinuity raised by the
different selves rationale. My argument proceeds in three parts.
In Part I, I document the surprising rise of the different selves
rationale in the courts and trace its scholarly origins. In Part II, I argue
both that the different selves rationale is internally inconsistent and
that it cannot be confined to the intimate context. I show that the
different selves rationale fundamentally departs from traditional
assumptions about personal identity by granting people freedom from
the decisions of previous selves and privileging current preferences
without substantial justification. I also point out the absence of
justifications for treating decisions related to intimate subject matter
differently from other commitments reflected in binding agreements.
In Part III, I demonstrate how theories of personal identity
undermine the assumptions on which the different selves rationale
rests. Proponents of the different selves rationale have expressed
skepticism regarding people’s ability to identify with their previous
choices and assimilate the choices into a broader understanding of
their lives. This skepticism, I argue, raises concerns addressed by
narrative identity theory, which suggests that a person can integrate a
wide range of experiences into a self-narrative that provides both
coherence and persistence over time. Together with other theories of
personal identity, narrative identity theory refutes assumptions about
discontinuity and demonstrates that efforts to protect the self by
privileging preferences at the time of the legal dispute are
23. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF
REGRETTED DECISIONS 26 (1998) (noting that the possibility that a “person may
evolve into a ‘later self’” “has had no significant impact on the courts”).
24. I discuss the lack of scholarly attention paid to this issue in Part I.B.,
infra.
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misguided. I conclude that if courts wish not to enforce the
agreements at issue, they must locate a different rationale.
I. CHANGED PREFERENCES, CHANGED SELVES?
We instinctively recognize that our choices, from the trifling to the
profound, say something about ourselves. Certain choices—“relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education”—are sufficiently “central to personal dignity
and autonomy” that the Supreme Court has seen fit to protect them
from state interference.25 Though the state cannot regulate many
personhood-constitutive choices, people sometimes seek the state’s
involvement by entering into agreements that they intend to be legally
binding.26 That is because the choices at issue, although intensely
personal, often involve the participation of other intimates and because
the decision-makers desire some certainty about the consequences of
their choices before they commit.27
Courts and scholars have struggled to make sense of judicial
involvement in this private legal space. On the one hand, it seems
inherent in choices of a constitutional stature that courts must respect a
person’s commitments regarding them. But when that person’s
preferences have changed, courts must struggle with the consequences
of holding the person to his earlier commitments, even if they were
initially his to make. This dilemma raises questions about the
continuity and identification between selves over time.
In this Part, I will define the concept of personal identity and
examine how contracts scholars and courts have engaged it. That
backdrop will serve to demonstrate how the different selves rationale
expresses a novel identity-skepticism within the contract context.
A. Defining Personal Identity
Although the phrase “personal identity” is not susceptible to a
single definition, I use the term here to refer to that which “makes
25. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
26. Parties have sought to enter binding prenuptial and postnuptial
agreements, agreements governing gamete donation and the use of in vitro
fertilization, agreements to serve as a parent or to avoid legal parentage, and
agreements to raise children in a certain religion or in a certain geographic area,
to name a few.
27. See, e.g., Matsumura, supra note 20, passim (discussing the importance
of contracts governing the use of assisted reproductive technologies in securing
the expectation of the parties); Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 1232, 1255
(noting the importance of contract law in protecting the parties expectations in
the context of marriage).
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one the person one is,” “unique as an individual and different from
others.”28 Theories of personal identity address the question of
what it means for a person to persist over time, such that it is
possible for a person in the present to identify with past and future
versions of herself.29 What, for example, allows a person to point
to a photograph of a child and say, “That’s me,” or enables a
person taking actions like quitting smoking to believe she is
benefiting a future version of herself rather than a different person?
Implicit in these questions is the notion that a person may change
in certain respects from time to time and that either that person or
others may feel the need to identify or connect the selves at both
points in time.30 A successful theory of personal identity will
answer these questions, grounding concepts of moral responsibility
and self-regarding action in the process.31
For centuries, philosophers have attempted to answer these
questions, both in terms of identification—how to tell whether
some present object is the same as a past object—and
constitution—specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions
for personal identity.32 Broadly speaking, the existing approaches
depend on either some sort of psychological continuity or
biological and physical continuity. Adherents to the psychological
approach believe that chains of psychological features—such as
beliefs, memories, preferences, rational thoughts, and desires—
connect a being over time.33 The psychological approach accords
with characteristics about the self that people value and commonly
associate with their identity, like their thoughts and memories. But
28. Eric T. Olson, Personal Identity, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2010), available at http://plato.stan
ford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/identity-personal/, archived at http://perma.cc
/8BXX-KTRN.
29. See id.; David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2012),
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/identity-ethics/,
archived at http://perma.cc/PWM2-JUWN.
30. Some psychologists have drawn a sharp distinction between the
concepts of “self” and “identity,” with “self” referring to “both the subjective
sense of ‘I’ and the objective sense of ‘me[,]’” and “identity” referring to the
“way that the I begins to arrange or configure the me[,] . . . provid[ing] life with
some semblance of psychosocial unity and purpose.” Dan P. McAdams, The
Redemptive Self: Narrative Identity in America Today, in THE SELF AND
MEMORY 95, 99 (Denise R. Beike, James M. Lampinen, & Douglas A. Behrend
eds., 2004) (first emphasis added).
31. See Shoemaker, supra note 29. I will elaborate on these theories in Part
IV.A., infra.
32. See MARYA SCHECHTMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF SELVES 7–8 (1996).
33. See DAVID DEGRAZIA, HUMAN IDENTITY AND BIOETHICS 13–22 (2005);
Olson, supra note 28; Shoemaker, supra note 29.
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it struggles to explain why we might think of a person in a
permanent vegetative state as the same as the previously-active
version of the person rather than a different person entirely. The
biological approach responds to this challenge by emphasizing the
importance of the physical body (or biological organism) in
providing persistence over time.34 Philosophers have long argued
about the validity of these approaches. But even philosophers who
contend that no theory can fully explain the concept of identity
agree that some relation must connect different selves over time.35
It is on that common ground that this Article rests.
The preoccupation with personal identity extends beyond the
realm of philosophy. As literary critic Peter Brooks has pointed
out, the question of “[w]ho you are—in the sense of what you can
legitimately call yourself, and what others call you”—became a
societal and legal preoccupation in the nineteenth century.36 The
quest for self-knowledge was one aspect of this preoccupation; the
desire to discipline and punish was another.37 Indeed, perhaps the
most salient purpose that personal identity serves in the law is
justifying the imposition of punishment for past acts.38
Punishment, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. Any time the
law seeks to deter or incentivize action, or impose consequences
for past behavior, it does so based on assumptions of personal
identity: a sufficient relation between multiple selves.39 For if I
was a different person yesterday than I am today and I will be
tomorrow, I could not plan for my future or suffer the
consequences of acts committed in the past.
The law, then, generally assumes the existence of a continuous
personal identity whatever the precise theory that justifies it.40 For
the remainder of this Article, I will refer to the law’s general
34. See DEGRAZIA, supra note 33, at 46–51; Olson, supra note 28;
Shoemaker, supra note 29.
35. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 313–20, 325 (1984) (noting
the presence of some relation between temporally distinct selves); Shoemaker,
supra note 29.
36. PETER BROOKS, ENIGMAS OF IDENTITY 4 (2011).
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U.
L. REV. 395 (1990) (considering the importance of personal identity to criminal
theories of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).
39. See id. at 412, 419–20; Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Policy and Personal
Identity Over Time, 62 TAX L. REV. 333 (2009) (noting the impact of personal
identity on how one assesses the distributional effects of tax policy).
40. See Dresser, supra note 38, at 427–35 (arguing both that the law
imposes consequences based on conceptions of personal identity and excuses
acts in situations where personal identity might come under question (based on
incapacity, lack of memory, etc.)).
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embrace of a continuous view of personal identity as the “generic
view” to distinguish it from the other, more specific, approaches to
personal identity discussed above.
B. Scholarly Foundations of the Different Selves Rationale
For the most part, existing scholarly accounts of contract law have
not devoted much attention to how personal identity affects the
enforceability of agreements.41 When concerns regarding cognitive
limitations or multiple selves in contracting have arisen at all, those
concerns have tended to focus on increasing the efficiency of
contracting practices, not relieving parties of their contractual
obligations.42 Although the dilemma that arises when a court enforces
41. Scholars recognizing contract law’s importance in allowing people to
satisfy their individual interests have largely accepted the generic view of
personal identity without question. Both law-and-economics and philosophically
minded scholars, for instance, presume an autonomous decision maker who may
benefit from or be morally obligated to perform his promises. The questions of
how contract law can facilitate the enforcement of economically efficient private
exchanges and discourage inefficient exchanges, or how it interacts with
concepts of moral agency, assume an autonomous decision-maker who is
meaningfully connected across time. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT
AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981); Richard
Craswell, In that Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the Demands of
Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 906 (2003) (identifying the value of efficiency
as the concern of most mainstream law and economics scholarship); Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REV.
481, 517 (2008) (discussing how the ability to make binding promises is essential to
the creation of meaningful personal relationships). There have been a few
instances in which scholars in other fields have noted the impact that a changed,
or multiple-selves view, would have on criminal punishment, see, e.g., Dresser,
supra note 38, passim, or marriage, see, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 58–62 (1990)
(suggesting that the concept of multiple selves might undermine the viability of
precommitment devices in the marital context).
42. A rich body of scholarly work incorporates findings of cognitive
psychologists and behavioral economists regarding the limits of parties to
accurately predict their future preferences or to reflect their “real” preferences in
the terms of an agreement. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1994) (identifying
cognitive limitations and analyzing their effect on contract law); Russell Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1203 (2003) (considering the implications of bounded rationality on the
enforcement of terms in form contracts); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen,
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000) (examining how various findings
from the behavioral sciences regarding heuristics and biases, the effect of
bargaining context, and deviations from self-interested behavior affect the
assumption of rational decisionmaking); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H.
Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and
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a commitment made by a previous self in order to bind an
unwilling later self has not escaped notice,43 the scholars tend to
assume a sufficient level of connection to justify enforcement of
agreements.44 Judge Richard Posner, for example, has argued from
an instrumental perspective that the law must view the selves as
connected in order to “promote[] social welfare overall by
maintaining socially valuable institutions, such as contract and
criminal punishment.”45 In short, these scholars embrace the
generic view of personal identity.
A few scholars, however, have argued that differences between
the selves over time should, at least in some circumstances, relieve
the later self from the earlier self’s commitments. Anthony
Kronman has provided one of the leading accounts of this
argument in his classic article, Paternalism and the Law of
Contracts.46 Because his contentions underlie and explain the
different selves rationale, I will deal with Kronman’s arguments at
some length here.
Kronman notes that every contracting situation gives rise to the
possibility that one may make mistaken assumptions about the
state of affairs, such that he will miss an expected benefit.
Although this miscalculation might cause disappointment, the

Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1037–41, 1054 (2012)
(providing a more recent summary of the development of the behavioral
economics literature in the legal academy). In a sense, this literature expresses
some degree of skepticism about the connection of the selves over time given
the problem that individuals might have at Time1 predicting how they will feel
about a commitment at Time2. This body of work, however, generally focuses
on the problems from an ex ante perspective—should we be skeptical about
certain types of commitments at the outset?—rather than an ex post
perspective—should we relieve a party of a commitment that he already made?
The different selves rationale differs from this body of work in that it adopts the
ex post rather than ex ante perspective.
43. Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves? Implications
for Law and Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23, 23 (1997); John A. Robertson,
Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50 EMORY L.J.
989, 997 (2001) (noting that the later self could argue he was not present for the
earlier negotiation).
44. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 43, at 24, 34.
45. Id. at 34.
46. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE
L.J. 763 (1983). To date, this article has been cited in over 250 law review
articles, some of which, in turn, have been cited by courts advancing the
different selves rationale. See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715, 719 (N.J.
2001) (citing Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 55, 88 (1999)).
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promisor will often understand his contract as a rational venture
given what he knew at the time he made the contract.47
However, Kronman argues that “[i]f [the promisor’s] goals
change, the contract may lose its original attractiveness and
become pointless (or even reprehensible) from [his] point of view,
despite the fact that all his assumptions about the world have
proven accurate.”48 A goal change—Kronman provides religious
conversion as an example—results in regret rather than
disappointment.49 As a result of the change, the original framework
within which he assessed the rationality of his previous decisions
no longer persists, undermining his confidence in the rationality of
his choices.50 Although it is sometimes possible to think outside
the framework of one’s current goals, a “more radical” shift
weakens a person’s ability to “review sympathetically” his past
decisions.51 This disconnect renders the previous decisions
irrational and senseless, resulting in a feeling of demoralization.
But demoralization does not necessarily counsel against all
forms of contract enforcement. Kronman notes that this
justification, based on the concept of personal integrity, comes into
play most strongly in the context of specific performance of
personal services contracts. Such contracts, if enforced, would
compel performance against the promisor’s will, leaving him no
choice but to act against his wishes in the manner promised,
thereby resulting in a form of self-enslavement.52 Although
damages might still engender some regret, performance intensifies
those feelings by reminding the promisor of the continuing
influence of his former goals in his life.53
Kronman’s theory is based on several assumptions touching on
personal identity. First, he believes it possible for a promisor’s
goals to change so substantially that the change renders previous
decisions irrational to the promisor. Second, the change in goals
can be so significant that it also leaves the promisor unable to
empathize with (or “understand the meaningfulness” of) his
previous choices.54 Third, this change in goals will render his
previous choice “demoralizing” in such a way that he may lose
“confidence in his ability to make lasting commitments and guard
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Kronman, supra note 46, at 780.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 780–81.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 778–79.
See id. at 783.
Id. at 781.
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the things he cares for.”55 And finally, the previous decision will
remain a “foreign element” in the promisor’s life.56
The inability of a person to integrate certain past choices into
her current framework creates a problem of self-identification.
Taken to their logical extreme, Kronman’s assumptions could
suggest that personal identity is discontinuous enough to prevent
holding a person responsible for earlier commitments. But he does
not appear to go that far: by limiting his theory to specific
performance of personal services contracts and allowing for the
imposition of damages, he appears to suggest that some degree of
responsibility—and therefore continuity—persists despite a
person’s change in goals.57 In sum, although Kronman’s arguments
challenge the generic view of personal identity, his refinements to
the theory remain unclear.
Following in the wake of Kronman’s article, several scholars
have also challenged the generic view of personal identity. Their
arguments primarily arise in the context of agreements for the use
of assisted reproductive technologies because of the sensitive and
far-reaching nature of personal commitments in that area.
Carl Coleman, for example, has argued that agreements for the
disposition of cryopreserved embryos created in the in vitro
fertilization process should not be enforced because those
agreements—which typically give frozen, fertilized embryos to
one of the two individuals who contributed genetic material, or
designate that the embryos shall be donated or destroyed—do not
protect an individual’s right “to make decisions consistent with
[his or her] contemporaneous wishes, values, and beliefs.”58
Coleman suggests that decisions made before undergoing the IVF
process may seem like those of a “completely different person” at
the time a dispute arises due to intervening life changes.59 Like
Kronman, Coleman recognizes that the law generally disregards
mere changes of heart as an excuse to perform a contractual
obligation.60 But Coleman does not point to a shift in goals as the
55. Id. at 782.
56. Id.
57. It is possible to interpret Kronman’s argument as not even applying to
all personal services contracts but only those in which a promisor’s goals have
changed. A person might not want to work for a particular employer because a
better offer has materialized, but might retain the same goal of making money. It
is unclear whether Kronman views his theory as applying to such a situation.
58. Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice:
An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV.
55, 88 (1999).
59. Id. at 91.
60. Id. at 92.
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justification for his deviation from the norm of enforcement.
Instead, he points to the fact that the law has traditionally treated
certain types of choices (related to reproduction or familial
relationships) as inalienable.61 The shortcoming of this approach is
that the judicial decisions on which he relies say nothing about
when internal changes should relieve a party of her own previous
commitments. Critics of surrogacy agreements based on the idea of
changed selves often commit a similar oversight: relying on
intuitions about the nature of reproductive decisions to advocate
for non-enforcement but not considering what those intuitions
imply about personal identity.62
In sum, contracts scholars have largely avoided developing a
full account of how personal identity relates to the enforceability of
agreements, implicitly endorsing the generic view. But a few
scholars have laid the groundwork for judicial decisions that, at
least in some circumstances, refuse to enforce agreements based on
differences between the selves.
C. The Rise of the Different Selves Rationale in the Courts
Through the years, courts have sometimes refused to enforce
agreements, especially those involving the use of assisted
reproductive technologies, on public-policy grounds.63 The
justifications proffered by the courts have changed over time to
reflect different judicial conceptions of harm to the public that
61. See id. at 92–95. As I will argue below, Coleman’s argument is
internally inconsistent. The decision to treat certain choices as inalienable
because they are central to personhood implies the existence of a continuous
personal identity. Otherwise, the infringement of those choices would not cause
harm to a person that would be long-lasting or engender regret. But if a
continuous personal identity exists, then he must provide a theory for when and
how a change in the self would justify relieving a person of his contractual
obligations.
62. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The “Sophie’s Choice” Paradox and
the Discontinuous Self: Two Comments on Wertheimer, 74 DENV. U. L. REV.
1255, 1256 (1997) (“The process of carrying and giving birth to a child so
fundamentally changes a woman—physically, emotionally, and socially—that
her very identity may change. . . . Because of this discontinuity of identity, the
prepregnant woman cannot bind the mother.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Baby M and
the Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO. L.J. 1811, 1818–19 (1988) (pointing to the
“changes in feeling that we know frequently occur, and that we generally want
to occur, during pregnancy and at birth”); Stephen G. York, A Contractual
Analysis of Surrogate Motherhood and a Proposed Solution, 24 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 395, 419 (1991) (claiming that surrogate mothers are “unable to critically
evaluate what their own desires and interests will be after the child is born”).
63. See Matsumura, supra note 20, at 178–90.
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would result from enforcement.64 The refusal to enforce an
agreement based on perceived differences between selves of the
same party over time, however, breaks new ground as the
following discussion will demonstrate.
Recall that in the A.Z. v. B.Z. case, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court refused to enforce an agreement between the
spouses that gave control of cryopreserved embryos to the wife in
the event of the couple’s separation because to do so would compel
a person to become a parent “against his or her will.”65 That
rationale has been extended in several other cases.
In J.B. v. M.B.,66 former spouses asked the New Jersey
Supreme Court to resolve a dispute over the possession and use of
cryopreserved embryos that the parties created during the IVF
process. In the case, a couple with fertility problems entered into a
written agreement with a fertility clinic in March 1995, stating that
“all control, direction, and ownership of our tissues will be
relinquished to [the clinic]” following “dissolution of our marriage
by court order, unless the court specifies who takes control and
direction of the tissues.”67 In May 1995, the IVF procedure was
carried out, resulting in the creation of eleven embryos, seven of
which were cryopreserved.68 The wife, J.B., became pregnant and
gave birth to the couple’s daughter in March 1996. Within six
months, though, the couple’s marriage unraveled, and J.B. told her
husband that she wanted the remaining embryos discarded. The
parties’ legal dispute centered on what would happen to the
remaining embryos: M.B. sought an order compelling J.B. to either
implant the embryos or allow their donation to infertile couples.69
He averred that the couple had come to an oral agreement before
undergoing the IVF process that any unused embryos would be
used or donated, a position consistent with his religious beliefs.70
J.B., on the other hand, claimed that the decision to use IVF was
“made during a time when defendant and I were married and
64. In In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), for example, the New
Jersey Supreme Court listed a number of harms that could result from the
enforcement of a surrogacy contract: “the impact on the child who learns her life
was bought, that she is the offspring of someone who gave birth to her only to
obtain money; the impact on the natural mother as the full weight of her
isolation is felt along with the full reality of the sale of her body and her child;
the impact on the natural father and adoptive mother once they realize the
consequences of their conduct.” Id. at 1250.
65. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000).
66. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
67. Id. at 710.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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intended to remain married” and “planned to raise a family
together as a married couple.”71 She asserted that she and her
husband never discussed what to do with remaining embryos if the
marriage dissolved.72
The J.B. court first considered whether the parties entered into
a binding agreement for the disposition of the cryopreserved
embryos. The case essentially presented the court with several
options: it could either look to the written consent form executed
by both spouses with the clinic; conclude that the parties entered
into an oral agreement as urged by M.B.; or conclude, contrary to
the existence of the written form, that the parties never discussed
what to do with the embryos if they divorced, as J.B. had claimed.
The consent form required both spouses to express their
preferences about what steps the clinic should take if the parties
were to divorce, but that clause “carve[d] out an exception that
permit[ted] the parties to obtain a court order directing disposition
of the preembryos.”73 The court concluded that this language was
too conditional and ambiguous to control.74 Moreover, the court
rejected M.B.’s assertion that the parties reached an oral
agreement, holding that any agreement for the disposition of
embryos would have to be “formal, unambiguous [as to] the
parties’ intentions,” and in writing.75
The court went on to hold that even if the parties had entered
into an unambiguous written agreement, their contractual freedom
would be limited in several respects. It recognized that the decision
at stake implicated interests of a constitutional magnitude and was
therefore “theirs to make.”76 But it implicitly rejected the notion
that the parties’ prior choices mattered if they later reconsidered:77
notwithstanding the fact that the clinic’s consent form asked
parties to specify their preferences if they divorced, the court
reasoned that “at the point when a husband and wife decide to
begin the in vitro fertilization process, they are unlikely to
anticipate divorce or to be concerned about the disposition of
preembryos on divorce.”78
Responding to the differences between the pre-divorce and
post-divorce selves, the court held that enforcement of an embryo
disposition agreement preventing a party from reconsidering a
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 713–14.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.
Id. (focusing on the problem of later disagreement).
Id.
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previous commitment would violate public policy.79 The court
expressed concern that “forc[ing]” a person “to become a
biological parent against his or her will”80 “could have life-long
emotional and psychological repercussions,”81 echoing Anthony
Kronman’s concerns about demoralization.82 The court therefore
held that it would enforce cryopreservation agreements “subject to
the right of either party to change his or her mind about disposition
up to the point of use or destruction of any stored preembryos.”83
This decision departs from a traditional contract approach:
enforcing an agreement only as long as the parties voluntarily
perform their obligations essentially amounts to a rejection of the
understanding of a contract as a binding agreement.84 This is
especially the case where the parties are allowed not to perform
based on their internal change of mind.85
The justifications for this departure implicate two key aspects
of the generic view of personal identity. First, the New Jersey
Supreme Court expressed suspicion about the ability of parties to
predict their preferences in the realm of childrearing and to
anticipate the effect of contingencies like divorce, even if
prompted by terms in the agreement. In other words, it doubted the
ability of parties to be self-regarding, at least in the area of
procreational decision-making.86 Second, the court questioned the
extent to which a person could be held accountable for his or her
prior decisions. By pitting a person’s “earlier acquiescence”
79. Id. at 718. I criticize the court’s reliance on public policy at length in a
previous work. See Matsumura, supra note 20, passim.
80. J.B., 783 A.2d at 718 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 717. The court’s concern about emotional and psychological
repercussions suggests its belief that a party’s change of position in these
circumstances will be genuine, substantial, and not based on strategic
opportunism or the bare desire to harm the other.
82. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text; see also Kronman, supra
note 46, at 782–83.
83. J.B., 783 A.2d at 719.
84. See, e.g., Recent Cases, Family Law—Contract—Supreme Court of New
Jersey Holds That Preembryo Disposition Agreements Are Not Binding When
One Party Later Objects, 115 HARV. L. REV. 701, 704 (2001) (“Because mere
disagreement by either party vitiates the contract in favor of balancing the
procreative rights of the parties, there is really no contract.”). On the other hand,
the court could have gone further and made the agreement itself illegal. See, e.g.,
Todd D. Rakoff, Is “Freedom from Contract” Necessarily a Libertarian
Freedom?, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 477, 477 (2004) (noting that on the extreme end
of the spectrum of contract enforcement are agreements that cannot even be
made without violating the law).
85. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 26 (noting that courts have
generally been unsympathetic to internal changes of mind).
86. J.B., 783 A.2d at 715.
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against his “subsequent[] reconsider[ation],” the court drew a line
between the selves, setting up a situation in which it would have to
choose which self to privilege.87 And by refusing to force a party
“to become a biological parent against his or her will,” it sided
with the current self.
We see these concerns reflected in several other judicial
opinions resolving embryo disposition disputes. In In re Marriage
of Witten,88 the Iowa Supreme Court also refused to enforce a
clinic consent form in which the parties indicated their preference
for the disposition of embryos. The spouses, Tamera and Trip, had
specified that the clinic could only release or dispose of embryos
with the signed approval of both spouses.89 Unlike the New Jersey
Supreme Court, the Iowa Supreme Court treated the consent form
as an otherwise valid agreement between the parties.90 But it
similarly rejected a contractual approach to the dispute, citing
Professor Coleman’s argument that “‘individuals are entitled to
make decisions consistent with their contemporaneous wishes,
values, and beliefs.’”91 Based on this view, the court held that
embryo disposition agreements would only be enforceable between
the progenitors as long as they did not change their minds and that
embryos would remain cryopreserved unless and until such a
change of mind occurred.92
Self-continuity-based concerns affect the enforceability of
other types of agreements as well. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court invalidated an agreement by a woman to co-parent
her former partner’s child based on its “reluctance to . . . bind
individuals to future family relationships.”93 Implicit in the fear of
“binding” a person is the assumption that the person does not wish
to be bound; but that person is only unwillingly bound in the future
87. Id. at 718.
88. 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
89. Id. at 772.
90. Id. at 773.
91. Id. at 777 (quoting Coleman, supra note 58, at 88–89).
92. Id. at 783. Interestingly, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the
agreements would be fully enforceable by the fertility clinics, notwithstanding
the parties’ inability to enforce the agreements against each other. See id. at 782.
Virtually all clinics only agree to store embryos for a certain length of time. The
Iowa Supreme Court therefore created a default rule favoring destruction of the
embryos in most circumstances.
93. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1250 (Mass. 2004). The nonmarital
status of the partners no doubt mattered a great deal here. The state of
Massachusetts apparently has no problem authorizing the voluntary adoption by
a stepparent, nor would it appear to hesitate to impose parental obligations upon
that stepparent. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 1 (2014) (setting forth the
grounds and procedures of adoption).
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if his or her earlier consent is not legally significant. Likewise, a
Pennsylvania court refused to enforce a prenuptial agreement
specifying that all of the couple’s children would be raised in the
Jewish faith.94 The court noted that it would be difficult for an
interreligious couple to “project themselves into the future” in
order to predict how they would feel about the raising of their
children and that the subject matter of the agreement would
infringe “[t]he constitutional freedom to question, to doubt, and to
change one’s convictions.”95
To be sure, there are other concerns at work in these decisions,
and the courts’ discomfort with available remedies is prime among
them.96 But these decisions all explicitly rest on differences
between the selves over time that the courts have treated as legally
relevant. In so doing, these decisions reveal that concerns about
self-continuity have gained purchase with the courts, even though
the courts’ conceptions of personal identity are often hazy at best.
In the next Part, I will argue that courts do in fact see the
different selves rationale as a viable solution to the problems posed
by intimate agreements. I will simultaneously investigate whether
the different selves rationale presents a plausible alternative theory
of personal identity in the contract context.

94. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1141 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). See
also, e.g., Weiss v. Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (Ct. App. 1996) (involving a
similar holding on a similar type of agreement).
95. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1146–47. The Zummo court arguably offers a
slightly different argument against enforcement based not on a disjuncture
between selves, but on the fact that religious beliefs are expected to change in a
“lifelong dynamic process.” Id. at 1146. Such a rationale could depend more on
the religious matter than views of the self. Nevertheless, the court’s decision
shares the notion that the generic view of personal identity does not suffice to
hold a person to his earlier commitments.
96. See, e.g., T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1251 (expressing concerns about “‘direct
enforcement’” of personal choices related to becoming a parent (internal citation
omitted)); Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781 (noting the court’s historical “reluctance
to become involved in intimate questions inherent in personal relationships”
because of problems with “enforcement”); In re Baby Boy C., 638 N.E.2d 963,
967 (N.Y. 1994) (declining to enforce a consent to adoption on the ground that it
would be difficult to order “faithful performance of such contracts”). In the
Zummo case, the court was troubled both by the vagueness of the childrearing
agreement and of concerns that interpretation of the agreement would lead to
entanglement with religious decision-making in violation of the First
Amendment. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1144–46.
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II. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE DIFFERENT SELVES
RATIONALE
In this Part, I explore the assumptions on which the different
selves rationale rests in order to demonstrate more fully what is at
stake in the decision to reject the generic view of personal
identity.97 By demonstrating the extent of the departure, this Part
will ultimately enable a better understanding of the role we expect
personal identity to play in contract law.
The different selves rationale of personal identity has
significant implications for contract law. Treating a contractual
commitment not as the expression of a person’s will but rather as
the binding of a later self, the legitimacy of which may be
questioned, opens up all agreements to scrutiny.98 Courts
advancing the different selves rationale appear to assume that the
rationale would only apply to certain intimate agreements. But the
implications of their position sweep broadly, especially in the
following three respects: (1) they question a person’s ability to
make future commitments; (2) they vastly extend freedom of
choice beyond the protection of the circumstances in which
choices are made to reconsideration of the choices themselves; and
(3) they privilege preferences at the time of the legal dispute over
preferences either prior to or after the dispute is resolved.
A. Future Commitments and Alienability
Proponents of the different selves rationale have largely limited
this rationale against contract enforcement to a class of
“emotional”99 or “delicate and intimate”100 decisions related to
matters of the family101 or freedom of conscience.102 This category
97. I acknowledge that the generic view of personal identity also reflects
certain assumptions or value judgments. Just because that view is “generic” does
not mean it is not ideological. Rather, the assumptions raised by the different
selves rationale should cause us to question how firmly we should adhere to the
generic view, and whether aspects of that view require revision.
98. A different selves rationale therefore creates a line-drawing challenge:
Is a changed preference always the preference of a different self? And does the
fact of a different self always excuse performance under an agreement or only in
conjunction with certain types of choices?
99. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781; J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717 (N.J. 2001).
100. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
101. See, e.g., Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781 (“marital and family relationships”);
J.B., 783 A.2d at 719 (“family relationships”); A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059 (“familial
relationships (marriage or parenthood)”).
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of choices closely tracks those that the Supreme Court has found to
reside in the liberty and privacy protections of the Due Process
Clause.103 The assumption that choices pertaining to the family or
intimate conduct—such as whether to get married or divorced, to
engage in sexual conduct, or to have or give up children—are
entitled to different treatment from other types of choices is not
novel. Some have responded by taking the position that these
intimate choices should be the subject of a rule prohibiting their
transfer on the market;104 others have suggested prophylactic or
protective rules to prevent improvident decisions.105 The different
selves rationale differs in its reasoning and prescriptive solutions
from these other legal issues but shares their line-drawing
challenges.106 That is to say, it struggles to explain why people
would be free to make certain choices in advance—like spousal
support provisions in prenuptial agreements—but not others—like
the use of cryopreserved embryos.107
102. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1141 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(involving the freedom to choose the religious upbringing of one’s children).
103. See Coleman, supra note 58, at 95–96 (arguing that reproductive
decisions are inalienable and noting that “most decisions about these matters are
constitutionally protected”); see also J.B., 783 A.2d at 716–17 (noting the
constitutional dimension of the choices at issue).
104. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1849, 1906 (1987) (proposing a market-inalienability rule for choices
“integral to the self,” such as choices pertaining to “politics, work, religion,
family, love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, experiences, wisdom, moral
commitments, character, and personal attributes”); Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 209–10 (2012) [hereinafter
Rothman, The Inalienable Right] (arguing that certain constitutional rights are
inalienable and that the right of publicity should fall within those protections).
105. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158–59 (2007) (prohibiting
certain abortion methods to protect women from the regret they could
experience upon finding out how their fetuses were terminated).
106. Critics of Professor Radin’s anti-commodification view note the
difficulties her theory faces in determining exactly which commodities should
be market-inalienable. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 26–27 (1993) (noting that Radin’s own proposed
approach requires a “case-by-case” determination of when the subject of a
transaction would be too central to personhood to be commodified and that it
ultimately raises empirical questions that her theory cannot answer). Professor
Rothman has likewise acknowledged that relying on the Supreme Court’s
category of “fundamental rights” to determine what an individual can properly
alienate is somewhat indeterminate. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating
Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 503–07
(2010).
107. The act of drawing lines between the intimate and non-intimate realms
is fraught with challenges. For example, Benjamin Means has called attention to
the prevalence of family-owned businesses and the complicated interplay
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But the difficulty of cabining the different selves rationale
extends beyond the indeterminacy of the category of marriage and
the family. A further problem with this limitation is that it fails to
explain why choices that people make all the time notwithstanding
their emotional nature cannot be the subject of advance agreement.
People make unilateral choices not to procreate by choosing
abstinence, birth control, or abortion.108 Some such choices, like
sterilization, are common and irreversible and are performed
notwithstanding the possibility of later regret.109 People also make
decisions regarding sex and reproduction involving others by
consenting to sexual contact—in essence waiving or transferring
the right to be free from unwanted contact or bodily invasion110—
or engaging in sexual behavior with the understanding that it could
result in the birth of a child.111 The law generally treats these
decisions as valid absent exceptional circumstances like coercion
or duress.112 The nature of these choices, then, does not render
them fully inalienable.113 The rights at stake—e.g., to engage in

between the economic and domestic functions of those businesses, as well as the
uncertain overlay between family law and corporate law when dealing with
governance disputes. See Benjamin Means, The Contractual Foundation of
Family-Business Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1,
15–20, passim) (on file with author).
108. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 43, at 1026 (“We can relinquish the
right [to reproduce] totally by sterilization. We may waive it in a particular
instance by abstinence, contraception, or abortion.”).
109. See, e.g., R.E. Lawrence et al., Factors Influencing Physicians’ Advice
About Female Sterilization in USA: A National Survey, 26 HUM. REPROD. 106,
106, 109 (2011) (noting that millions of women have used female sterilization in
the U.S., and that physicians often perform the procedure despite their
recognition that the patient might experience regret); Susan D. Hillis et al.,
Poststerilization Regret: Findings From the United States Collaborative Review
of Sterilization, 93 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 889, 890 (1999) (noting the
prevalence of sterilization and regret).
110. See Shiffrin, supra note 41, at 500, 502 (conceiving of consent to
intimate conduct as the transfer of an obligation that an agent “otherwise could
make about entry into her personal space”).
111. Cf. Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 428–31 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming the
imposition of parental obligations on a man based on his voluntary sexual
conduct).
112. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of
Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1379 (2013) (explaining how the value
of sexual autonomy intersects with evolving prohibitions on rape).
113. As Professor Radin and others have noted, “[m]eanings [of
‘inalienability’] proliferate because the separation that constitutes alienation can
be either voluntary or involuntary, and can result in the entitlement, right, or
attribute ending up in the hands of another holder, or in its simply being lost or
extinguished.” Radin, supra note 104, at 1852. As a result, when people use the
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sexual contact, to have a child through one’s genetic material, or to
terminate one’s parental rights—can be given or transferred and in
some cases even sold.114 Moreover, many of these decisions have
significant consequences: the decision to have a child creates a
long period of legal obligation, accompanied by the additional
burden of caring about that child’s well-being or having that
child’s existence attributed to you by others;115 sterilization, once
done, cannot be undone, at least absent significant expense; the
decision to surrender a child for adoption may create lasting
regret.116
The real issue is why these decisions, which we acknowledge
can freely be made now, cannot be the subject of advance
agreement. The underlying choice itself largely remains constant,
as do its consequences. The primary reason for discomfort with
these agreements, therefore, is their futurity.
Courts generally do not experience this discomfort when
dealing with the transfer of property of sentimental value, such as
the family home. Nor do they prevent the advance waiver of other
constitutional rights. Although virtually all constitutional criminal
protections can be waived contemporaneously,117 some can also be
waived by advance agreement. Probationers, for example, can
waive their Fourth Amendment right against suspicionless searches
in their probation agreements.118 Agreements that waive a party’s due
process or Seventh Amendment rights (through settlement, private
arbitration, or forum-selection clauses) are routinely enforced, as are
agreements restricting free speech, such as confidentiality

term “inalienable,” they could mean that an entitlement, right, or attribute is
“nonforfeitable,” “noncancelable,” “nonwaivable,” “nongiveable,” “nonsalable,”
or “completely nontransferable.” Id. at 1853.
114. Sperm and egg “donors” are typically compensated by fertility clinics
for their gametes. See Nancy E. Dowd, Sperm, Testosterone, Masculinities and
Fatherhood, 13 NEV. L.J. 438, 442 (2013).
115. See I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1115, 1135–37 (2008) (describing the psychological harms that might
result from public recognition that he or she is a genetic parent even in absence
of legal or gestational obligations).
116. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 255, 280 (2011) (noting that regret over surrenders rarely affects the
validity of consent to adoption); Coleman, supra note 58, at 82 n.42.
117. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to
Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1186 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, The
Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate].
118. United States v. King, 711 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding a
search pursuant to a “warrantless search condition, . . . with or without probable
cause”).
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agreements.119 Although many scholars have expressed discomfort
with these waivers,120 the long-term trend has favored them.121
The approval of agreements providing for the advance waiver
of other constitutional rights does not necessarily mandate similar
treatment for choices of the type protected by substantive due
process. But it does mean that one cannot simply rely on the fact
that the choices are constitutionally protected in order to
categorically exempt them from the realm of contract. To treat
them differently requires some sort of justification. One possibility
is that people are more likely to change their minds regarding these
intimate choices than other types of choices in their lives. Another
is that separate policy reasons exist to restrict choices of this nature
because of some perceived harm to the person or to society.122
None of the proponents of the different selves rationale make these
arguments or offer support for them. These justifications do not
even sound especially plausible from an armchair perspective: are
people really more likely to change their views about having
children than they are about what type of career to pursue with
their law degree or whether to own or rent a home?123
119. See Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, supra
note 117, at 1186–91 (providing examples); Rothman, The Inalienable Right,
supra note 104, at 217 (noting that “one can waive one’s speech rights by
agreeing to be employed by the government, which brings with it certain
restrictions on what one can say”). Rothman also argues that even if the
common law right of publicity were constitutionally protected, it should still be
the proper subject of a limited contractual waiver. See Rothman, The Inalienable
Right, supra note 104, at 209, 234.
120. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and
Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 269–74 (1998) (providing
examples of contracts restricting speech but ultimately arguing that not all
advance waivers of speech rights should be allowed).
121. The mechanics of waiver by contract is a subject that deserves more
attention than I am able to give it in this Article. By citing examples of other
types of constitutional waivers, I do not mean to endorse the validity of those
waivers in all instances. I only intend to prove that something more than the
constitutional status of a right must justify its inalienability.
122. This last reason is less plausible given that courts have said that the
government has no business interfering in these types of decisions.
123. A meta-analysis of regret-ranking studies found that people were more
likely to regret decisions about education or careers than decisions about romance or
family. Neal J. Roese & Amy Summerville, What We Regret Most . . . and Why, 31
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1273, 1281 (2005). One colorful example
involves Angus T. Jones, a star on the popular sitcom “Two and a Half Men,” who
recorded a video in which he asked viewers to “‘please stop watching’” his
show and said he no longer wished to appear on it. Bill Carter, Another Star
Lashes Out, and “Two and a Half Men” Keeps Cruising, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27,
2012, 3:43 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/anotherstar-lashes-out-and-two-and-a-half-men-keeps-cruising/, archived at http://per
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In other words, the justifications for the different selves
rationale are that the self has changed and that the self has changed
with respect to intimate choices differently than it has changed
with respect to other choices that the courts and commentators
would not see fit to protect. Unless these underlying assumptions
hold, there is either no reason to depart from the generic view of
personal identity or no reason not to consider the different selves
rationale in other areas of contracting.
B. Beyond Negative Liberty: The Unbounded Self?
Conceptions of autonomy can range from thin to thick based on
how broadly the right of personal autonomy is characterized and
how far the law is willing to go to protect it.124 The different selves
rationale presumes an incredibly thick right, yet undermines it in
significant respects.
The Supreme Court has said of the types of choices captured in
intimate agreements that “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain
intimate conduct.”125 This understanding of autonomy sounds
capacious. But even the Court’s arguably more far-reaching
decisions, like the recent decision in United States v. Windsor,126
have largely sought only to protect conditions in which such
choices are made by striking down governmental restrictions.127
These decisions are not helpful when it comes to resolving
disputes over private agreements, however, because they do not
ma.cc/U9D4-W2HR. People speculated that Jones’s change of mind was
influenced by his religious beliefs. See id. Within a week, Jones publicly
apologized for his remarks. Id.
124. See Rubenfeld, supra note 112, at 1417 (contending that in the area of
sex, courts’ conceptions of autonomy are “very thick”).
125. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
126. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (striking down section three of the
Defense of Marriage Act because it “demeans the couple, whose moral and
sexual choices the Constitution protects . . . and whose relationship the State has
sought to dignify”).
127. See id.; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.”). The notion that the
Constitution only guarantees a form of negative liberty has been challenged by
scholars, see, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88
MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990), and is, at any rate, supplemented by laws creating
positive obligations on behalf of the state, see, e.g., Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1120 (2002) (noting that the
state has an affirmative duty to protect its citizens’ rights of privacy through
“property rights, tort law, criminal law, and other legal devices”).
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answer the question of whether a person’s previous choices
constitute an improper restriction of his current freedom. In other
words, having removed improper restraints on a person’s initial
choice, has the state satisfied its constitutional obligations? 128 Or
must the state protect the person from his prior choice in order to
ensure his privacy or liberty? The different selves rationale
answers the latter question affirmatively: to enforce the agreement
would amount to the state “forcing” the person to do what he no
longer wishes rather than the person himself doing the forcing.129
By conferring a right to reconsider one’s initial choice, the
different selves rationale conveys a much broader freedom of
action than the generic view of personal identity. That is because
the person’s freedom of action is not constrained by the state or by
that person’s prior commitments. The person is given the right to
always live in accordance with his “basic sense of self” at the
present moment, the self unbounded.130
However, by enhancing a person’s individual freedom, the
different selves rationale diminishes that person’s ability to pursue
goals that require the cooperation of others. Many choices of an
intimate nature are collaborative rather than atomistic: sex,
reproduction, and marriage all involve the participation of others.
As numerous contracts scholars have noted, one’s ability to obtain
something of value often depends on securing the cooperation of
another; where neither party has a guarantee that the other will

128. Implicit in these questions is a larger, and unresolved, dispute about
whether enforcement of private agreements can violate the Constitution, and in
what circumstances. The most comprehensive discussion of this issue within the
context of agreements for the use of reproductive technologies can be found in
Cohen, supra note 115, at 1172–83 (concluding that the enforcement of private
agreements likely does not trigger state action). Other scholars have assumed
that enforcement would constitute state action without lengthy analysis of the
issue. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 43, at 1027 n.167; Marjorie Maguire
Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity
for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 362 (1990) [hereinafter Shultz,
Reproductive Technology]. Although I sidestep the state action question now, I
intend to address it in future work.
129. On the issue of “forcing,” see A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057
(Mass. 2000); Coleman, supra note 58, at 96.
130. Coleman, supra note 58, at 96. Coleman suggests that “[m]aking the
right to control these decisions inalienable ensures that, as a person’s identity
changes over time, she will not be forced to live with the consequences of prior
decisions” like “mourning, guilt, and regret.” Id. at 96–97. As I discussed above,
however, even contemporaneous choices on reproductive matters can have
unavoidably significant consequences. And as I will discuss in the next Part, the
choices one makes at the time of the legal dispute can bring future regret.
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perform, there may be a failure to deal.131 Even where there is not,
when parties do enter into agreements, granting each of them the
freedom to reconsider his or her earlier commitments leaves both in a
position to infringe the freedom of the other. In In re Marriage of
Witten, for example, the practical consequence of granting Trip Witten
the freedom to object at any time to the use of cryopreserved embryos
created with his sperm was that Tamera, his ex-wife, could never use
those embryos barring his later change of mind.132 Although one
might argue that Tamera could reproduce through other means, she
was a thirty-six-year-old with a history of fertility problems, so her
ability to have a biological child was certainly made more difficult
without the cryopreserved embryos.133 In J.B., it was the wife’s
preference not to use the embryos that interfered with the husband’s
desire, consonant with his religious beliefs, to create life.134
By granting a right to reconsider one’s initial choices, the
different selves rationale also illustrates the influence of existing
default rules that operate to resolve stalemates. Although either
party to an embryo disposition agreement could subsequently
prefer to use the embryos rather than to destroy them, a rule
regarding contemporaneous mutual consent for use would always
privilege non-use.
Thus, even when courts provide individuals maximum freedom
to reconsider their earlier decisions, their choices may be limited
by others’ choices or default preferences.
C. Choosing Between Selves
The previous two subparts demonstrate that the different selves
rationale raises questions that could significantly impact the way we
think about contractual commitments. The rationale raises an
additional conceptual question: acknowledging that preferences
131. Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 1255–56 (suggesting that relationships
that do not impose legal consequences for defection discourage investment in
those relationships).
132. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003).
133. Brief of Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 8, In re Marriage of
Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) (No. 03-0551); Reply Brief of
Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 8, In re Marriage of Witten, 672
N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) (No. 03-0551).
134. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 712, 720 (N.J. 2001). Several scholars have
found this harm to the other contracting party’s reliance interests sufficient to
justify a rule protecting them. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 43, at 1001–04,
1029. I agree that reliance is a powerful concern in this context, but do not
depend on this independent line of thinking in my analysis of the identity
problem.
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change, why privilege a person’s preferences at the time of a legal
dispute?
On first glance, a later preference might seem more valid than
an earlier preference, as it can take into account both the earlier
preference and subsequent changes. Implicit in this view is the
assumption that additional information makes the subsequent
preference superior to the previous, less-informed preference.135
Note, as an initial matter, that honoring the later preference on this
basis would depart substantially from the traditional view in
contract law that a commitment is binding even without complete
information on all possible contingencies: “you must often decide
on the basis of such information as you already have or can
conveniently acquire, and you are expected, by and large, to bear
the consequences of not having enough.”136 But even accepting
this reasoning, a person’s preferences at the time of the legal
dispute should not necessarily control. That is because the
possibility of change, and the inevitability that new information
will be acquired as one lives her life, invites the possibility of
future change. In short, there is still a future prediction problem at
the time the court resolves any contract dispute.
People change their minds both before and after lawsuits. Yet
courts, hesitant to impose “permanent” consequences based on
superseded preferences, may make decisions with permanent
consequences based on preferences that are no less transitory.
Examples certainly exist of parties who have appeared before the
courts with certain desires regarding choices of personal
significance and have subsequently changed their minds.
A particularly well-known example is Norma McCorvey, the
“Roe” of Roe v. Wade.137 McCorvey agreed to be a plaintiff in a
lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Texas’s anti-abortion
statutes.138 In the complaint, she alleged “that she was unmarried
and pregnant” and that “she wished to terminate her pregnancy by
135. Rebecca Dresser relies on this reasoning to question the desirability of
medical advance directives. See Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided
Strategy for Securing Death With Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823, 1835 (2003);
see also Coleman, supra note 58, at 90 (providing a hypothetical scenario
regarding the disposition of cryopreserved embryos in which a wife who
formerly elected to donate her remaining embryos finds, after having children
successfully through the IVF process, that the idea of others raising her children
would offend her deeply).
136. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 22.
137. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (limiting the ability of states to prohibit abortion).
138. See Joshua Prager, The Accidental Activist, VANITY FAIR, Feb. 2013, at
113, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2013/02/norma-mccorveyroe-v-wade-abortion, archived at http://perma.cc/W2XD-YTJC .
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an abortion.”139 Between the filing of the complaint and the
Supreme Court’s decision nearly three years later, she gave birth to
a child and placed it for adoption, yet she still publicly praised the
decision.140 For a time in the late 1980s and early 1990s, McCorvey
continued to advocate in support of abortion rights.141 In 1995, though,
McCorvey changed her views after experiencing a religious
conversion, ultimately creating a non-profit organization with the
purpose of undoing the effects of her previous involvement in the
reproductive rights movement.142 In 2003, she even filed a motion for
relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
seeking to revisit the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe.143
McCorvey’s shift provides anecdotal support for a
commonsense assumption: if people’s preferences are likely to
change on certain matters, then they may still change after a legal
dispute. Proponents of the different selves rationale ignore this
point. The J.B. court, for example, held that it would not enforce
prior agreements disposing of cryopreserved embryos because
“[e]nforcement . . . at some future date in a case where one party
has reconsidered his or her earlier acquiescence” could force a
party “to become a biological parent against his or her will.”144 It
therefore affirmed a lower court decision to destroy the
embryos.145 What the court failed to recognize is that by having the
embryos destroyed, it nominally protected the ability to reconsider
but foreclosed the possibility of future changes of mind: neither
spouse could thereafter decide to use those embryos to reproduce.
Nothing in the different selves rationale justifies treating a predispute change of mind differently from a post-dispute change. If
our preferences about important matters are likely to change
throughout our lives so that we cannot be held tomorrow to our
choices of today, the point of resolution is just an arbitrary
snapshot. Although there may be legal, procedural reasons for
differentiating between commitments expressed in a contract and
commitments made before the court (judicial estoppel, increased
139. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120.
140. Prager, supra note 138, at 113.
141. See id. at 114.
142. Id. at 115.
143. See McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 847 (5th Cir. 2004) (describing the
procedural history of McCorvey’s action).
144. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 718 (N.J. 2001).
145. See id. at 720. The court left open the possibility that the embryos could
remain frozen for some additional period of time if J.B. would consent and M.B.
would pay the storage fees, but it is unclear whether that in fact occurred. See id.
Moreover, even a period of prolonged storage could not last forever for practical
reasons including the length of time the fertility clinic agreed to store the
embryos.
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formality, etc.), those differences cannot prevent internal changes
of mind, as McCorvey’s case indicates. Certainly the solemnity of
the marriage ceremony and the signing of the marriage license do
not prevent divorce in any measurable way.146 Nor does the value
of “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life”147 differentiate between pre-dispute and post-dispute changes
of mind.
The different selves rationale calls into question the defining
attributes of contract law: its futurity, its ability to hold parties to
discarded choices, and its ability to identify preferences to enforce.
But it raises more questions than it answers: to what choices
should the different selves rationale apply, and why should the law
protect the preferences expressed at the time of a legal dispute over
the preferences expressed at other times? These deficiencies
suggest that the different selves rationale fails on its own terms.
III. PERSONAL IDENTITY AND CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS
As the previous Parts have demonstrated, the different selves
rationale challenges the legitimacy of holding people responsible
for commitments made by their earlier selves based on changes of
preference related to certain highly important decisions. The
different selves rationale does not appear to go so far as to suggest
that people are physically discontinuous over time—e.g., that
differences in their physical bodies cause the later self to be a
different person—nor does it question some meaningful level of
psychological connectedness—e.g., shared emotions, memories, or
preferences.148 It therefore cannot be squared with the theories that
make up the generic view of personal identity.149 A case could be
made, however, that the different selves rationale demands a
heightened standard of identity that accounts for the ability to
integrate past and present preferences regarding important matters.
This concern raises questions that sound in the register of an
emerging theory of personal identity: narrative identity. This Part

146. Nor does the petitioning of the court for the right to get married, as the
experience of the named plaintiffs in the landmark Massachusetts marriage
equality case, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003), indicates. See Michael Levenson, After 2 Years, Same-Sex
Marriage Icons Split Up, BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 2006 (discussing the split of
Julie and Hillary Goodridge).
147. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (quoting Moore v. E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)).
148. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
149. See supra Part I.A.
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evaluates the validity of the different selves rationale in light of
that theory.
A. The Concept of Narrative Identity
Scholars in various fields have converged on an appreciation of
the role that narrative plays in the establishment of personal
identity. Recall the questions that theories of personal identity seek
to answer: What makes one the person one is? What connects a
person over time? These questions raise problems of sameness or
reidentification—whether a thing at Time2 is the same as a thing at
Time1—and the challenge of characterization—what makes one
the person one is.150 The answers to these questions support the
attribution of responsibility or compensation for past actions and
justify self-interested concern about the future.151 Paul Ricoeur has
suggested that people have an “intuitive pre-understanding” of the
role that narrative plays in answering these questions: “do not
human lives become more readable [lisibles] when they are
interpreted in function of the stories people tell about themselves?
And these ‘life stories,’ are they not rendered more intelligible
when they are applied to narrative models—plots—borrowed from
history and fiction (drama or novels)?”152
Proponents in the fields of philosophy and psychology largely
agree on the defining aspects of narrative identity.153 At its core,
narrative identity is self-constitutive. A leading proponent in
philosophy, Marya Schechtman, has argued that “a person creates
150. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 32, at 2; Paul Ricoeur, Narrative Identity,
35 PHIL. TODAY 73, 74–75 (1991).
151. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 32, at 2 (identifying “survival, moral
responsibility, self-interested concern, and compensation” as the “four basic
features of personal existence”).
152. Ricoeur, supra note 150, at 73.
153. Several legal scholars have noted the popularity of the theory of
narrative identity outside the legal academy, although it has made little headway
within. See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, Accommodating Technological Innovation:
Identity, Genetic Testing and the Internet, 57 VAND. L. REV. 965, 973 & passim
(2004) (examining how technological innovations affect perceptions of identity);
Sean Hannon Williams, Self-Altering Injury: The Hidden Harms of Hedonic
Adaptation, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 568–72 (2011) (analyzing the intersection
between hedonic damages and narrative identity in the tort context). Despite this
theory’s popularity, this Article does not suggest that narrative identity
definitively solves the identification and characterization questions. See supra
Part II.A.1. DeGrazia, for example, argues that the concept of narrative identity
cannot explain why a person may continue to exist even in the absence of a
narrative identity (e.g., in a vegetative state) or why narrative identity cannot
continue to exist when the human animal no longer does (e.g., death). See
DEGRAZIA, supra note 33, at 79–80, 114.
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his identity by forming an autobiographical narrative—a story of
his life.”154 “[I]ndividuals constitute themselves as persons by
coming to think of themselves as persisting subjects who have had
experience in the past and will continue to have experience in the
future, taking certain experiences as theirs.”155 The inclusion of
traits, actions, and experiences into the self-narrative become the
person’s “by virtue of that inclusion.”156 This self-constitutive
approach to identity explains why a person can take responsibility
for past acts or steps in her future self-interest: a person’s identity
is hers “because she acknowledges her personhood and
appropriates certain actions and experiences as her own.”157
The narrative form helps a person “make sense of meanings
that unfold in and through time.”158 A person is likely to
experience a “wide range of different, and likely conflicting, roles
that characterize a given life in the here and now,” as well as
contrasts that occur over time.159 One’s personal identity must
integrate both types of contrasts, a process that is not always neat
or easy.160
The narrative form plays an important role in providing
coherence. According to Schechtman, “[p]erhaps the most salient
feature of the narrative form in general is that the individual
incidents and episodes in the narrative take their meaning from the
broader context of the story in which they occur.”161 Under this
154. SCHECHTMAN, supra note 32, at 93.
155. Id. at 94.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 95. See also Ricoeur, supra note 150, at 77 (“The act of telling or
narrating appears to be the key to the type of connectedness that we evoke when
we speak . . . of the ‘interconnectedness of life.’”).
158. Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW’S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 14, 14 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz
eds., 1996).
159. HENRY RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 152
(1994) (noting the independence of the coherence of one’s views at any given
time and the “constancy of one’s commitments through time”); McAdams,
supra note 30, at 99–100. McAdams presents the following example of
synchronic contrasts: “‘When I am with my father, I feel sullen and depressed;
but when I talk with my friends, I feel a great surge of optimism and love for
humankind.’” McAdams, supra note 30, at 99. He provides the following
examples of diachronic contrasts: “‘I used to love to play baseball, but now I
want to be a cognitive psychologist.’ Or, ‘I was a born-again Christian, but these
days I feel I am an agnostic.’” Id. at 99–100.
160. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 32, at 97–98 (noting a spectrum of
intelligibility ranging from “perfect intelligibility—a life story in which every
aspect coheres with every other” to “a random sequence of experiences that have
little, if any, relation to one another”).
161. Id. at 96.
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view, no particular time-slice of a life is fully intelligible on its
own. Schechtman suggests that narrative identity depends on the
existence of a “plot” or “story” that allows a person to have a selfconception as a “well-defined character.”162 Psychologists have noted
that the reliance on stories is part of the developmental process during
which a child becomes an adult. It is at adolescence when a person
realizes that “one’s life, as complex and dynamic as it increasingly
appears to be, might be integrated into a meaningful and purposeful
whole.”163 Because “[i]n virtually all intelligible stories, humans or
humanlike characters act to accomplish intentions, generating a
sequence of actions and reactions extended as a plot in time,” these
stories are particularly useful to adolescents struggling to arrange
“potentially discordant and unrelated aspects of selfhood into a
purposeful psychosocial configuration.”164
The reliance on plot, which inherently depends to an extent on
inherited or provided stories, raises additional concerns. The
existence of narrative identity, however, and the value of the
purposes it serves, are difficult to refute.
People generally seek self-continuity. A coherent sense of self
is thought to be healthy from a psychological point of view. It is
related to higher levels of self-esteem, positive affect, and
authenticity, and to lower levels of depression or negative affect.165
The absence of self-continuity is “the hallmark of some forms of
psychopathology, particularly some personality disorders,” and is
linked to an increased risk of suicide.166 Considering the extreme
case of an individual without any narrative self-conception “whose
sentience is focused always on the present and never extends . . . to the
past or future,” Schechtman concludes that such a life would be so
162. Id. at 96–97.
163. McAdams, supra note 30, at 101. Some cognitive functions that pertain
to identity formation, such as autobiographical memory, no doubt begin to
develop far before adolescence. See, e.g., Mark L. Howe, Early Memory, Early
Self, and the Emergence of Autobiographical Memory, in THE SELF AND
MEMORY 45, 45 (Denise R. Beike, James M. Lampinen, & Douglas A. Behrend
eds., 2004).
164. McAdams, supra note 30, at 101.
165. Susan Bluck & Nicole Alea, Remembering Being Me: The Self
Continuity Function of Autobiographical Memory in Younger and Older Adults,
in SELF CONTINUITY: INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE PERSPECTIVES 55, 65 (Fabio
Sani ed., 2008).
166. Kate C. McLean, Stories of the Young and the Old: Personal Continuity
and Narrative Identity, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 254, 254 (2008). See
also Fabio Sani, Introduction and Overview, in SELF CONTINUITY: INDIVIDUAL
AND COLLECTIVE PERSPECTIVES 1, 3 (Fabio Sani ed., 2008) (“A lack, or a
seriously weakened sense, of self continuity is considered one of the most
typical disorders of the self.”).
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different from the “kind of life led by the rest of us” as to render the
individual a non-person.167 The foregoing sources suggest a consensus
that self-continuity is generally desirable regardless of whether one
takes so strong a view about what makes one a person.168
Self-continuity is also a prerequisite for self-regarding behavior.
As David DeGrazia has observed, “[f]rom the standpoint of the
present, we would like to be able to anticipate having experiences and
performing actions, not just accept the promise that we will, in fact,
experience and act. Put another way, we want to be able to identify
with the future subject-agent, regarding her subjectivity as a
continuation of our own.”169 Various aspects of the narrative process
facilitate this orientation to future goals. Psychologists have noted the
role of autobiographical memory in locating and defining the self
within an ongoing life story that has future implications.170 The
narrative process allows a person to consider the relationship of past
events to valued ends, to place them in temporal or sequential order,
and to give those relevant events meaning based on the status of the
goal (triumph, failure, etc.).171 Coherence and constancy also

167. SCHECHTMAN, supra note 32, at 101.
168. This is not to say that there is unanimous acceptance of narrative
identity. For example, while admitting its widespread acceptance, philosopher
Galen Strawson has argued that the notion that people experience their lives as a
narrative is both descriptively false and harmful to those who do not experience
their lives narratively. See Galen Strawson, Against Narrativity, XVII RATIO
428, 428–29 (2004). My argument, however, does not depend on complete
unanimity of opinion as to the merits of narrative identity, nor does it depend on
refuting Strawson’s critique. Even if, as Strawson suggests, some people
experience the world “episodically” as opposed to “diachronically,” see id. at
430, I do not understand him to be making the claim that such individuals are
prevalent. Moreover, as I argue in Part III.B.1, infra, psychological differences
may actually justify different legal treatment. It is simply not the case, though,
that proponents of the different selves rationale have attempted to justify
application of the rationale based on these types of psychological differences.
169. DEGRAZIA, supra note 33, at 80.
170. See Donna Rose Addis & Lynette J. Tippett, The Contributions of
Autobiographical Memory to the Content and Continuity of Identity, in SELF
CONTINUITY: INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE PERSPECTIVES 71, 72 (Fabio Sani
ed., 2008); Bluck & Alea, supra note 165, at 55; McAdams, supra note 30, at
103.
171. See Jefferson A. Singer & Pavel Blagov, The Integrative Function of
Narrative Processing: Autobiographical Memory, Self-Defining Memories, and
the Life Story of Identity, in THE SELF AND MEMORY 117, 125 (Denise R. Beike,
James M. Lampinen, & Douglas A. Behrend eds., 2004); see also RICHARDSON,
supra note 159, at 151 (noting that “looking back upon our entire lives is a good
way to crystallize out of those self-understandings the hopes and aims we have
for the long run”).
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enable a person to coordinate with others to achieve shared goals
and to carry out activities that extend over a long period of time.172
Anticipation of the future affects a person’s present experience
in at least two senses. First, expectations of future pleasure or pain
actually bring about related emotional experiences in the
present.173 Thinking about a future painful experience (such as
rejection from graduate school) brings about current discomfort.
Additionally, because a person’s actual future will bring about
certain expected experiences, a person will be motivated to take
certain responsible actions (like studying for a test).174 By
connecting the present self with the expected future, narrative
actually shapes the present by engendering concern with the
narrative as a whole.175 The belief that the life is a narrative whole
therefore grounds concepts of moral agency by facilitating futureregarding action and allowing a person to situate it within his own
self-narrative. And it grounds concepts of moral responsibility by
placing both the person who committed an action and the person
experiencing its consequences within the same narrative.176
In sum, the concept of narrative identity is useful because it
accords with how most people understand personal identity as a
descriptive matter and explains how the self mediates between past
experiences and future goals. By providing an account of how the
selves connect—through a person’s own agency—narrative
identity also justifies the imposition of punishments and rewards as
well as paternalistic interventions, both by the self and by the state
(such as saving for retirement or discouraging smoking).
B. How Narrative Identity Theory Undermines the Different
Selves Rationale
Narrative identity theory addresses the primary concerns raised
by the different selves rationale and offers support for the
enforcement of agreements.
The argument here proceeds in three parts. First, I demonstrate
that concerns about the identities or the “selves” of a party to a
contractual dispute do not justify non-enforcement of agreements.
Second, I argue that the future-regarding and self-constituting
aspects of narrative identity suggest that people should generally
172. RICHARDSON, supra note 159, at 152 (calling coordination the “crucial
pragmatic benefit of coherence”).
173. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 32, at 155.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 157.
176. See id. at 158.
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be held to the consequences of their choices. Third, I comment on
the limits of the narrative identity theory in the contract context.
1. Concerns About Differences Between the Selves Should Not
Normally Relieve Parties of Their Contractual Commitments
At this point, it is useful to restate the leading arguments
against the enforcement of prior commitments based on concerns
about personal identity. Kronman speculated that a promisor’s
goals might sometimes change so substantially that his previous
decisions would now seem irrational and foreign to him.177 The
inability to understand his previous choice would render it
“demoralizing” and cause him to lose “confidence in his ability to
make lasting commitments.”178 Building on Kronman’s theory,
Coleman suggested that decisions regarding the use of assisted
reproductive technologies could seem like those of a “completely
different person” at the time of a subsequent contract dispute due
to intervening life changes.179 He argued that choices related to
reproduction or familial relationships would be subject to change,
such that they should remain inalienable.180 Courts have sometimes
adopted these views, deciding that a person should not be able to
bind his future self on matters of personal importance.181 The
narrative identity theory addresses the assumptions inherent in
these arguments.
a. Against the Discontinuity Assumption
First, the narrative identity theory suggests that assumptions
about discontinuity are descriptively false, at least in the
presumably healthy individuals that normally enter into
agreements. The maintenance of a sense of personal continuity “is
crucial to psychological adaptation throughout the life course” so
much so that its absence is “the hallmark of some forms of
psychopathology.”182 Most people appear to strive toward selfcontinuity and integrate even significant goal changes within their
narrative identities, e.g., “‘I was a born-again Christian, but these
days I feel I am an agnostic.’”183 Of course, new experiences can
177. See Kronman, supra note 46, at 780–82.
178. Id. at 782.
179. See Coleman, supra note 58, at 91.
180. See id. at 92–95.
181. See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 718 (N.J. 2001) (refusing to make
someone a genetic parent “against his or her will”).
182. McLean, supra note 166, at 254.
183. McAdams, supra note 30, at 100.
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cause a person to revise her self-narrative, but that experience is
usually processed through the narrative instead of externally to
it.184 This characteristic suggests that people are likely to view
even painful experiences as their own.
It is true that some individuals lack the ability to form a
coherent self-narrative because of incapacity or illness. Infants, for
example, lack the cognitive abilities necessary to conceive of
themselves as distinct individuals persisting through time.185
People suffering from severe dementia or Alzheimer’s disease
might also lose their access to a narrative identity because their
consciousness “cannot be pulled together in a coherent whole.”186
Serious dissociative disorders such as dissociative identity disorder
(previously described as multiple personality disorder), in which
an individual has at least two distinct and relatively-enduring
identities or personality states, may also prevent an individual from
crafting a coherent self-narrative.187 Even less pathological
dissociative symptoms associated with posttraumatic stress
disorder or childhood abuse may interfere with a person’s selfnarrative to some extent.188 These conditions could very well
prevent people from remembering, understanding, or identifying
with a past choice.
A few researchers have studied the possibility that even people
who do not suffer from pathological dissociation might nonetheless
experience a certain “sense of discontinuity of the self across
time.”189 These studies, however, reveal that even though some
individuals feel less of a connection to the past, they still remember
184. See, e.g., McLean, supra note 166, at 254.
185. SCHECHTMAN, supra note 32, at 146. See also Howe, supra note 163
(providing an overview of the development of autobiographical memory and its
relation to language skills from a developmental psychological perspective). In
an interesting discussion of access to assisted reproductive technologies by
adolescents, Michele Goodwin and Naomi Duke have made a compelling
argument that courts should focus on the capacities of the particular teens
seeking treatment. Michele Goodwin & Naomi Duke, Capacity and Autonomy:
A Thought Experiment on Minors’ Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology,
34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 503, 551–52 (2011). The ability of a child or
adolescent to craft a coherent self-narrative is closely related to the capacities
test that Goodwin and Duke develop. See id.
186. SCHECHTMAN, supra note 32, at 147.
187. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS-5 (2013).
188. On the use of the Dissociative Experiences Scale to measure
dissociative symptoms, see Eve Bernstein Carlson & Frank W. Putnam, An
Update on the Dissociative Experiences Scale, 6 DISSOCIATION 16, 16 (1993).
189. James M. Lampinen, Timothy N. Odegard, & Juliana K. Ledding,
Diachronic Disunity, in THE SELF AND MEMORY 227, 231 (Denise R. Beike,
James M. Lampinen, & Douglas A. Behrend eds., 2004).
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it.190 And they still appear to understand that past within the
framework of a continuous story. As an example of someone
experiencing “diachronic disunity,” the authors of one study
provide the following statement from a subject:
I feel that I am not the same person I was five years ago,
because I have changed spiritually. I am now a Christian,
and I look at life completely differently from the way I did
five years ago before I was saved. Because of my faith in
Christ I no longer worry like I used to. I do not get stressed
out as much. I do not get offended like I used to either.191
This statement adopts a narrative perspective that draws on
experiences in the past to make sense of the present. The speaker
does not only refer to his or her current state (a Christian) but
recognizes “change[]” and “differen[ce].” The speaker perceives
the experience of being “saved” as having brought about
developments in his or her personality that the speaker perceives to
be beneficial. It seems clear, therefore, that regardless of the fact
that the speaker self-identifies as a different person, he or she
exhibits the characteristics of continuity that support the existence
of a unified narrative identity.
Underlying the different selves rationale is a misplaced
assumption about the impact of improvident decisions. Adherents
to that position worry about the harm to a current self brought
about by a prior bad decision. What the literature on narrative
identity suggests, though, is that in addition to providing unity, the
narrative process is adaptive. That is, it prevents previous decisions
from sticking out like a foreign element in a person’s life.
Although some psychologists have recognized that certain
experiences may best be characterized as a foreign element, for
example, as a result of trauma192 or because society suppresses
dialogue regarding those experiences,193 they are the rare exception
and can—and perhaps should—be recognized as such. Suffice it to
say that most contract disputes do not involve choices of that sort.
Support for the concept of a narrative identity therefore strikes at
190. Id. at 249.
191. Id. at 237.
192. See, e.g., Sarah L. Halligan et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Following Assault: The Role of Cognitive Processing, Trauma Memory, and
Appraisals, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 419, 419 (2003)
(discussing the effects of a traumatic experience on the self-narrative).
193. See Robyn Fivush, The Silenced Self: Constructing Self from Memories
Spoken and Unspoken, in THE SELF AND MEMORY 75, 75 (Denise R. Beike,
James M. Lampinen, & Douglas A. Behrend eds., 2004) (discussing the
silencing of sexual abuse and its effect on the self-narrative).
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the core of the different selves rationale, namely the suggestion
that there are substantially different selves at play in contracting
situations.
b. Against the Assumption of Limits on Future-Regarding
Choice
Second, the narrative identity theory suggests that people can
make future-regarding choices in the service of their goals on a
range of matters and that it is possible to deliberate about how
those choices will affect their future selves. An implication of
Coleman’s position that any number of intervening events will
render reproductive decisions obsolete is that a person cannot
adequately look out for her future self in that regard. But, as
proponents of a narrative identity theory make clear, selfcontinuity satisfies the present desire for our lives “to continue to
unfold and include . . . future actions and experiences.”194 Nothing
in the literature suggests that conscious choices about intimate
matters that people memorialize in agreements are less bound up in
expectations about the future or result from different decisionmaking processes.
c. Against Privileging the Time2 Self
Moreover, the concept of narrative identity reveals the extent to
which courts adopting the different selves rationale privilege the
later self without any legitimate basis for doing so. When courts
and commentators refer to changed or later selves, or problems
with self-binding, they do not remain neutral but side with the self
that appears before the court in the actual dispute.195 What the
narrative framework makes clear, though, is the extent to which
this decision rests on illusions of narrative authority. Recall that
the different selves rationale could not justify why a court should
impose final consequences based on preferences that had already
changed but might logically change again at some later time.196
The literature on narrative identity explains why this is the case. A
person constructs a narrative identity to make sense of the
experiences and events in one’s life. The self-narrative may be

194. DEGRAZIA, supra note 33, at 81 (emphasis added).
195. See supra Part II.C.
196. Id.
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relatively stable, but even the goals around which the narrative is
oriented can change.197
Because the end goals can change over time, there is no
objective standard by which to assess the validity of any given
action or preference. When a person creates her self-narrative, she
does so only from a position of limited authority because she does
not know how her story will ultimately unfold. Interestingly,
multiple researchers have observed differences between older and
younger adults that reflect this reality.198 Although change is still
possible, older adults, with less of their lives to look forward to and
more important decisions in the rearview mirror, “have a welldefined sense of self that shows remarkable stability and
resiliency.”199 Younger adults, in contrast, experience more
uncertainty regarding the extent to which they have changed and
spend more time reinterpreting old events in light of newer
experiences.200 One can infer that closer proximity to the end of the
life story provides more interpretive certainty regarding its
component parts.
This subjectivity has not been lost on literary critics who study
the narrative form. It is only in light of known ends that we can
make final judgments about the significance of particular
occurrences. Peter Brooks has observed that:
[N]arratives work back from their ends, which are the real
determinants of their vectors, the direction and intention of
their plotting. . . . [A] large part of [a narrative’s] coherence
derives from the knowledge that an end lies in wait, to
complete and elucidate whatever is put in motion at the
start.201
197. Denise R. Beike, Erica Kleinknecht, & Erin T. Wirth-Beaumont, How
Emotional and Nonemotional Memories Define the Self, in THE SELF AND
MEMORY 141, 147 (Denise R. Beike, James M. Lampinen, & Douglas A.
Behrend eds., 2004). Henry Richardson has suggested that even the content of
ultimate ends, such as happiness, are subject to deliberation and revision. See
RICHARDSON, supra note 159, at 226.
198. Bluck & Alea, supra note 165, at 58.
199. Id. (comparing the responses of individuals around the age of 70 to
individuals around the age of 20).
200. Id. at 66. See also McLean, supra note 166, at 255 (noting that younger
people “narrate the self in terms of change” due to the instability of their identity
and life experiences, the greater sense of possibilities in the future, and the
greater potential to integrate new material into their life stories).
201. BROOKS, supra note 36, at 125. See also Peter Brooks, Repetition,
Repression, and Return: Great Expectations and the Study of Plot, 11 NEW
LITERARY HIST. 503, 504 (1980) (arguing that characteristics of a plot “already
suggest the predominant importance of the end as that moment which
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In other words, we can only be sure whether actions were on the
whole “good” or “bad,” or reflective of the person’s “true”
interests at the end. “[H]ow can we condemn something that is
ephemeral, in transit?,” Milan Kundera has asked.202 “In the sunset
of dissolution, everything is illuminated by the aura of nostalgia,
even the guillotine.”203
The lack of authority may not be apparent to a particular person
at a particular time because of the person’s ability to modify her selfnarrative to suit her developing needs. Philosophers and psychologists
alike believe that people can and do craft their narratives in the
absence of perfect finality.204 The legal system, however, struggles
with this lack of authority because it seeks to resolve disputes at a
particular moment. It struggles to impose “truth” upon a moving target
whose movements might render a judicial decision obsolete.
Preoccupied as it is with the concept of final ends, the law has
imposed finality where it might not otherwise exist. As an
example, Brooks points to the “inevitable discovery” exception to
the exclusionary rule articulated in Nix v. Williams.205 In that case,
the criminal defendant guided law enforcement to the body of his
victim after a detective gave a “Christian burial speech” in
violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.206
The Court reasoned that the body was within the area that would
have been searched, had the search not been called off because of
the defendant’s actions, and would therefore have been found
independently.207 But as Brooks points out, the Court’s doctrine of
inevitable discovery “clearly starts from the end of the trail of the
search—at the dead body—and then traces the path, be it
inevitable or merely probable, that would have led to it.”208 We see

illuminates, and casts retrospective meaning on the middle, and indeed defines
the beginning as a certain desire tending toward the end”).
202. MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING 4 (Trans.
Michael Henry Heim, Harper & Row 1984).
203. Id. As Walter Benjamin has argued, it is the knowledge and finality of
death that we are denied in our own lives and that we seek in the narratives we
consume. Walter Benjamin, The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai
Leskov, in ILLUMINATIONS 101 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans. 2007)
(1968).
204. See supra note 197.
205. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
206. Id. at 441 (describing how the officer emphasized to the defendant, who
was being driven from one part of Iowa to another, how much he desired finding
the body of the victim before snowy weather set in so that the victim’s parents
could give her a “Christian burial”).
207. See id. at 449–50.
208. BROOKS, supra note 36, at 124.
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the Court crafting its narrative in light of a known end begotten
through admittedly illegitimate means. The case method
introduced at Harvard Law School by C.C. Langdell provides
another example of “retrospective prophecy” in the law.209
Standing at the point of the outcome, the decision in a particular
case, “[t]he point of the exercise, in a pedagogical and cognitive
sense, is to retrace how that outcome was inevitable from the ‘facts
of the case.’”210 Satisfaction comes from understanding, based on
the known ending, that “it had to be this way and no other way.”211
In short, courts and commentators have resisted this indeterminacy
by treating current preferences as fixed and resolving the dispute in
light of those preferences. They assume an end, ultimately true or not,
and work back from there.
Not only does this retrospective approach shift attention away
from the context of the dispute in an ongoing narrative, but it also
begins from the starting point of the party’s changed preference rather
than asking, in the first instance, whether the choice was problematic
at the time it was made. Courts adopting the different selves rationale,
for example, have framed the inquiry in terms of whether it would be
permissible to enforce an agreement over a party’s later objection.212
They explicitly look backwards from the party’s current preference.
Typically, courts considering most contract disputes focus on the
parties’ circumstances and understandings during the contract
formation process.213 The different selves rationale skips the question
whether the choice was properly made, substituting categorical
limitations on the party’s power to agree. In Witten, for example, the
court, relying on Coleman’s argument that it may “be impossible” to
make advance “decisions about intensely emotional matters, where
people act more on the basis of feeling and instinct than rational
deliberation,”214 adopted a rule against enforcing decisions involving
marriage and family relationships.215 From the court’s perspective as
209. See id. at 134.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Iowa 2003)
(“[A]re prior agreements regarding the future disposition of embryos
enforceable when one of the donors is no longer comfortable with his or her
prior decision?”); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 718 (N.J. 2001) (asking whether
“[e]nforcement of a contract that would allow the implantation of preembryos at
some future date in a case where one party has reconsidered his or her earlier
acquiescence” would be permissible).
213. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
214. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
215. See id. at 781. Nancy Kim has criticized this decision on different
grounds, arguing that the court improperly failed to consider gender-related
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the arbiter of a present dispute, this conclusion may sound reasonable.
But it bypasses an inquiry into the actual circumstances of the
contracting process, instead assuming that the agreement resulted from
these deficiencies. This type of reasoning diminishes individual choice
on matters of personal importance by foreclosing the possibility of
responsible and rational decision-making without even looking at the
circumstances in which the agreement was made.216
d. Summary
At bottom, narrative identity theory demonstrates the
weaknesses of the assumptions underlying the different selves
rationale. It posits that personal identity is more continuous than it
is discontinuous, that it adapts to and incorporates difficult
experiences instead of alienating them, and that it continually
develops rather than remaining fixed in time. It further explains
why judicial interventions based on later, but not final, preferences
are unjustified.
2. The Future-Oriented Aspect of Narrative Identity Weighs in
Favor of Enforcing Agreements
One might argue that even if the theory of narrative identity shows
that the different selves rationale is wrong, it offers only a weak
argument, if anything, in support of contract enforcement. In this
section, I take on that argument and show that the future-regarding
factors that should have recognized and protected the wife’s detrimental
reliance. Nancy S. Kim, Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural Context, 45
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 660–68 (2010). Although her prescribed solution—
recognizing a claim for promissory estoppel—differs from my own, she also
calls attention to the court’s misplaced emphasis on the self at the time of
adjudication rather than the selves at the time of contracting. See id. at 660–68.
216. The retrospective framework used by the Witten court echoes the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in its decision upholding the Federal ban on partialbirth abortions, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). There, the Court did
not focus on whether a woman could prospectively make an informed decision
to use one of the banned abortion procedures. Rather, it assumed that some
women would make uninformed decisions without the law. Upon learning more
about the banned procedures, those women would “struggle with grief more
anguished and sorrow more profound when she learn[ed], only after the event,
what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and
vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child . . . .” Id. at 159–60.
Reasoning backwards from this hypothetical situation, the Court inferred that
the regulation might “encourage some women to carry the infant to full term” or
might encourage the medical profession to “find different and less shocking
methods to abort the fetus in the second trimester.” Id. at 160.
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aspect of personal identity is a valuable concept threatened by the
different selves rationale and vindicated by narrative identity.
People value their connection to their future selves. Continuity
allows people to “pursue longer-term projects that [they] value and
to become the sorts of people [they] want to be.”217 As discussed
above, people not only derive pleasure (and pain) from considering
themselves in a future state, but they also benefit from their
connection to their future selves by taking self-regarding actions
that they believe will improve their position.218 These benefits
inure to both people and the society in which they live. These
values are well established and seemingly beyond debate—few
would argue for a policy that explicitly prevents people from
taking actions in their future self-interest. Indeed, many public
policies, like individual retirement accounts and nutritional
labeling, aim to increase future-regarding action.
The connection of a person to her future self justifies the
apportionment of reward and punishment. This feature benefits
society by justifying socially beneficial institutions: much of the
law, for instance, is concerned with imposing consequences for
past actions.219 But punishment does not only depend on a
connection between the present and the past but also between the
present and future. As Steven Knapp has explained, punishment
requires a strong identity-relation between the person and the act
for which she is being punished:220
The question . . . is whether it makes sense to treat a person
existing in the present as still the appropriate object of
attitudes appropriate to an action she performed in the past.
Taken seriously, this can only mean thinking of her as still
performing the act in question. For unless she is thought of
as still performing the act, . . . she no longer has any control
over the act’s occurring or not occurring; she has no more
power over it than anyone else.221

217. DEGRAZIA, supra note 33, at 82.
218. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text.
219. Posner provides the examples of contract and criminal law, but this
argument applies as well to most of the law governing the legal relations
between persons. See Posner, supra note 43, at 34.
220. There are a few exceptions to this general rule, such as when the law
holds a person vicariously liable for the acts of another. I thank Dick Craswell
for bringing this point to my attention.
221. Steven Knapp, Collective Memory and the Actual Past, 26
REPRESENTATIONS 123, 136 (1989).
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A person cannot literally continue to perform an act that has
already occurred. Identification with one’s action, therefore,
supplies the identity-relation:
We punish [people] in order to make them identify with the
act in a way that will constitute their taking responsibility
for it. . . . [B]eing responsible in this sense precisely means
having a disposition to identify with one’s own actual past,
to think of oneself as inseparably bound to it, even as if one
were presently performing one’s past acts and therefore
appropriately liable, in the present, to the experience of
aversion that should have accompanied the bad ones or the
experience of pleasure that should have accompanied the
good ones. . . . We want to cause people . . . to anticipate
that they will be unable to deny their identity with the
selves they are when they commit whatever crime they
contemplate committing.222
As Knapp explains, self-regarding action depends on a person’s
ability to take seriously the effect her actions will have on her
future self. This indirect form of behavioral control suffers from
the fact that both the past and the future are particularly weak
constituencies in the present. Narrative identity helps to improve
this process by bridging the past and future. The justification of
punishment and reward in turn benefits the individual by making
her world seem less irrational: “Whereas it seems right to reward
virtuous action with something that is pleasant to the virtuous
subject, it also seems right to detract from the ill-gotten pleasures
of the vicious subject.”223
Moreover, as Jeremy Waldron has pointed out, the legal system
depends to a large degree on the ability and willingness of people
to “apply[] officially promulgated norms to their own conduct,
rather than waiting for coercive intervention from the state.”224 For
this feature to work, people must be viewed as having the ability to
act on behalf of their future selves.
To the extent that narrative identity theory facilitates the
foregoing societal benefits, departure from that paradigm should
not occur thoughtlessly. Still, it is a bit more difficult to value the
individual harms caused by the different selves rationale. The harm
to the party who relied on the agreement or performed to her
222. Id. (original emphasis omitted).
223. SCHECHTMAN, supra note 32, at 158.
224. Jeremy Waldron, How Law Protects Dignity, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 200,
207 (2012) (citing the work of Lon Fuller and Hart and Sacks in support of this
proposition).
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detriment is clear enough: her expectations regarding matters of
importance would be defeated and she might have suffered
inconvenience or cost in the process. The harm to the other party
would be more difficult to quantify. One could argue, for instance,
that a judicial proclamation that a person could not make a
particular decision in his best interest on a matter of great personal
importance225 might be demoralizing. Such a decision would also
deny the person’s agency with respect to that choice.226 Finally, it
might interfere with the person’s motivation or ability to integrate
that experience into his coherent self-narrative.227 Those arguments
should be met with skepticism, however. It seems that narrative
identity is a resilient concept capable of justifying a person’s selfinterested requests of the court. And it is doubtful that any of the
parties advocating a different selves rationale feel a loss of selfrespect as a result of the litigation position that they adopted.228
Nonetheless, the different selves rationale causes harm to
individuals invoking it by restricting their freedom based on an
impoverished conception of personal identity. The defining aspect
of narrative identity as laid out in the numerous sources cited in
this Article is that of self-constitution: people control their
identities by including traits, actions, and experiences into their
self-narrative and giving them meaning through the narrative
process.229 This view of personal identity accords with the notion
of dignity as a status-concept recognizing a person’s “ability to
control and regulate her actions in accordance with her own
apprehension of norms and reasons that apply to her,” and
assuming her capability “to give an account of herself . . . that
others are to pay attention to.”230 The dual aspects of authority over
oneself and recognition of that authority by the state informed
Justice Kennedy’s pervasive use of the term “dignity” in the
Supreme Court’s recent decision invalidating a portion of the
225. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988) (stating that a
surrogate mother “never makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite
clearly any decision prior to the baby’s birth is, in the most important sense,
uninformed”).
226. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 32, at 159 (noting that the “inclusion of a
particular action in a person’s self-narrative situates it in his life in such a way
that he has agency with respect to it”).
227. See id.
228. Because I assume the lack of support for the notion that a person will
suffer harm as a result of the different selves rationale, any future empirical
work will most likely strengthen as opposed to undermine my argument in this
section.
229. See supra notes 154–157 and accompanying text.
230. Waldron, supra note 224, at 3.

2014]

BINDING FUTURE SELVES

119

Defense of Marriage Act.231 Discussing the marital relation, Justice
Kennedy observed that “[r]esponsibilities, as well as rights,
enhance the dignity and integrity of the person.”232 To Justice
Kennedy, the “recognition” by some states of same-sex unions as
marriages “conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense
import.”233 By imposing “restrictions and disabilities” on that
state-provided status, the federal government subjected married
same-sex couples to “indignity”—depriving those couples of the
recognition—and rights and responsibilities—that the states sought
to provide.234
The different selves rationale embodies skepticism about a
person’s ability to make binding commitments and, as a result,
affords people less dignity than that to which they are entitled.
Variants of the different selves rationale have been used to
invalidate agreements pertaining to surrogacy,235 embryo
disposition,236 and childrearing237 on the ground that it would be
improper to compel a person to perform certain acts against his
will, i.e., to a promise made by another version of himself with no
authority to bind him. It does not take much imagination to see
how the same rationale would apply to numerous other
arrangements. Sperm donor agreements provide one example.
Many of these agreements require donors and recipients to make
long-term commitments to fertility clinics concerning the same
types of “intimate” subject matter involved in the cases cited
above. Donors, for example, may agree to provide sperm on the
condition that their identity will be kept strictly confidential; other
donors may agree to be contacted by their genetically related
children at some later time.238 At stake in these agreements are the
fathers’ and children’s rights to know or not know genetically
related family members and potentially to establish or refuse to
231. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
232. Id. at 2694.
233. Id. at 2692.
234. Id. For a detailed discussion of Justice Kennedy’s use of “dignity” in
previous opinions, see Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:
Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1703–04 &
passim (2008).
235. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
236. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); A.Z. v. B.Z.,
725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
237. See, e.g., Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1141, 1146–47 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1990).
238. The problem that arises in a long-term arrangement like this by virtue of
the sheer number of years between promise and performance is separate from,
and potentially additional to, the internal change of mind that the different selves
rationale identifies.
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establish a family connection with them.239 In such a situation, a
person could attempt to have his contemporaneous preference
honored so as to defeat the expectations of the other party.
The irony, of course, is that by treating people’s choices as
subject to change and refusing to impose consequences for them,
the proponents of a different selves rationale undermine the dignity
of the committing parties in the very realm of the law in which
dignity is arguably most essential. Moreover, as demonstrated
above, the reasons to confine the view to intimate agreements are
very thin.240
A more fully considered understanding of personal identity
therefore suggests that holding people to their commitments
actually benefits rather than harms them. Personal identity offers a
reason to enforce agreements rather than a reason not to.
3. Limits of the Narrative Identity Theory
To be clear, this Article does not claim that the theory of
narrative identity justifies the enforcement of all intimate agreements.
For instance, traditional defenses to contract formation or enforcement
raise independent reasons (going to defects in the bargaining process,
unconscionable terms, etc.) for not enforcing agreements. Depending
on how they are drafted, embryo disposition agreements, for example,
might fail to anticipate changes in circumstances that justify relief
from the terms of the agreement.241 Moreover, courts may face
limitations on the remedies they are able to provide. Even if a
gestational surrogacy agreement were enforceable, for example, a
court might not be able to order specific performance of a provision
requiring the gestational surrogate to abort or refrain from aborting
the fetus.242 The self-protective aspect of the different selves
239. See Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 392–94 (2012);
see also, e.g., Doe v. XYZ Co., 914 N.E.2d 117, 118 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009)
(involving an attempt by a user of anonymous sperm to obtain personal
information of a donor whose identity a fertility clinic agreed to keep
anonymous).
240. See supra Part III.A.
241. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261 (excusing
performance due to unanticipated impracticability), 265 (excusing performance
due to unanticipated frustration of purpose) (1981).
242. See, e.g., Shultz, Reproductive Technology, supra note 128, at 361–62
(arguing that such a contract could not be specifically enforced); see also
Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights,
Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 336
(1985) (predicting that the government’s enforcement of a contract not to
terminate a pregnancy would violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
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rationale is simply an illegitimate basis not to enforce an otherwise
binding agreement.
I am also sensitive to the concern that society’s dominant
narratives might lead people to commitments that are not truly
their own or are problematic because their burdens fall more
heavily on certain classes of people. From an early age, for
example, girls are taught to give voice to the emotional aspects of
their personal experiences to a much greater extent than boys,
which affects the way both women and men engage in their
activities and understand their experiences.243 It is therefore
possible that certain decisions—e.g., to spend more time at home
or to view oneself as a breadwinner—could be determined by these
inherited narratives. The fact that societal narratives might
privilege certain groups over others raises concerns when a person
from a disadvantaged group makes a choice that we perceive to
disadvantage him.
This concern is difficult to deny but also difficult to value.
First, it would be challenging to separate out pernicious influences
from benign ones. Is one’s choice of self-narrative more heavily
influenced by gendered scripts or by the individual interactions
that person had with his parents? Second, it is difficult to
determine with confidence whether a person’s choice of selfnarrative was actually influenced by these external scripts instead
of any number of external circumstances, like past experiences that
are unique to every person. Third, as discussed above, selfnarratives are more or less valuable to a person based on their
coherence, not their objective content. The fact that one’s choices
reflect dominant societal narratives would not seem to affect the
ability of a person to craft a more or less coherent self-narrative.
Finally, the deterministic view “flies in the face of both
phenomenology, which suggests to each of us . . . that she can
change herself or her life direction to some extent, and everyday
social observation, which suggests that other people sometimes
manage such self-changes.”244 As DeGrazia has noted, even
though all of us live within constraints stemming from our genetic
makeup or past experiences, “our choices and efforts often play a
significant role in determining what we do and become.”245
Though preferences influenced by socialization may seem less than
fully autonomous, it is often the case that a person would be
inclined to identify with those preferences either dispositionally or
243. See Fivush, supra note 193, at 76–82.
244. DEGRAZIA, supra note 33, at 91.
245. Id.
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upon conscious reflection.246 And presumably, upon reflection, a
person could explain and integrate a change of preference into his
ongoing self-narrative.
It is therefore unconvincing that some degree of determinism
lessens the usefulness of the narrative identity concept. If that
person views certain decisions as belonging to her self-narrative,
our external skepticism will have little to say about her narrative
identity and cannot defeat the purposes that narrative identity
serves for her.247
CONCLUSION
Many parties find themselves experiencing a change of heart after
entering into a binding agreement. When individuals enter into
agreements concerning choices that they deem significant—whether
pertaining to intimate matters or resulting in other types of opportunity
costs—they may experience strong regret or demoralization over their
previous decision. This Article has considered whether changes of
mind regarding intimate subject matter ever justify relieving a person
of his or her earlier commitments.
The rise of personal identity as a matter of concern in the law
of contracts has its roots in two parallel legal developments:248 the
increased recognition of freedom from state interference in the
realm of sex, reproduction, and family relationships even outside
the status of marriage;249 and the trend toward privatization in
family law.250 Both developments privilege the rights of
individuals to make personal decisions long deemed significant in
the law and in society. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,251 the Court
246. See id. at 101–02.
247. I do not argue here that paternalistic interventions are never appropriate,
although I think that interventions in the intimate realm often express values that
reinforce, rather than challenge, oppressive stereotypes and should therefore be
viewed with suspicion. See Matsumura, supra note 20, passim. The question is
whether concerns about narrative identity justify identity-protective interventions,
rather than interventions based on concerns related to unconscionability, defects in the
bargaining process, legislatively enacted policies, etc.; I answer in the negative.
248. By focusing on these developments, I do not mean to imply that
numerous other social and legal changes did not also play a role.
249. See JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE
CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 109–20, 146–55
(2011) (discussing the constitutional protection of decisions to use
contraception, engage in same-sex sodomy, abort a fetus, and marry persons of
one’s choice); Shultz, supra note 1, at 266–72.
250. See Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
1443, 1444–45 (1992).
251. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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recognized a “right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.”252 Thirty years later, in Lawrence v. Texas,253 the
Court framed that concept even more broadly, stating that the right
to liberty—which “presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct”254—prevented states from criminalizing consensual
homosexual sodomy between adults.255 As a result of these and
related decisions, choices once subsumed in the status of marriage,
such as those pertaining to sex and procreation, have become
available to individuals both in and outside of marriage.
Meanwhile, courts that had once refused to recognize any
private agreement that could undermine the status of marriage,
either by changing its duties, encouraging its dissolution, or
recognizing alternative arrangements like cohabitation,256 began to
enforce agreements between cohabitants and between spouses that
governed the exit from marriages.257 Around the time of these
developments, scholars began to devote more attention to the ways
in which private ordering could secure some of the rights and
choices previously covered by marital status.258 Greater
enforcement of private agreements in the courts led many scholars
generally to conclude that few state-prescribed marital obligations
remained that could not be altered by the parties, and that “private
norm creation and private decision making ha[d] supplanted stateimposed rules and structures for governing family-related
behavior.”259 Now that people were free to make choices that were
252. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
253. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
254. Id. at 562.
255. Id. at 579.
256. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 249, at 209–10 (noting courts’
suspicion of the power of private agreements to change the status of marriage);
Matsumura, supra note 20, at 173 (describing the types of agreements void
under the public policy doctrine).
257. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) (holding that
express agreements of cohabitants could be enforced); Posner v. Posner, 233 So.
2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970) (allowing enforcement of prenuptial agreements
notwithstanding marriage’s role as the “foundation of the familial and social
structure of our Nation” in light of the “commonplace fact of life” of divorce).
258. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (considering
relationship between private ordering during divorce and laws governing marital
dissolution); Shultz, Reproductive Technology, supra note 128 (providing a
comprehensive analysis of potential forms of private ordering in marriage).
259. Singer, supra note 250, at 1444. See also Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at
1234.
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previously forbidden, contract, it would seem, would be a natural
partner in giving effect to those choices.
But as I and others have argued, rumors of the marital status
regime’s demise are greatly exaggerated. Although agreements
regarding the disposition of property, like prenuptial agreements,
are widely enforced, agreements involving sexual reproduction,
child rearing, and spousal duties within an ongoing marriage are
often not enforced.260 It is no accident that concerns about identity
have arisen within the context of intimate agreements. Courts and
commentators have long struggled to understand how to reconcile
individual decision-making in this realm with the entrenched status
regimes from which those choices emerged. In other words, it is
difficult to determine whether certain choices—like the right to
decide whether to reproduce—should be treated as inalienable
because they are inherently special or because they were
historically treated as outside the power of a person to make. Part
II of this Article concluded that the reasons commonly thought to
support differing treatment do not do so and that concerns about
personal identity cannot relieve a person of these commitments. In
short, the liberty to make a range of constitutionally protected
decisions does not prevent a person from binding herself to her
decisions. Although there may be other remaining reasons not to
enforce certain types of intimate agreements, this Article strongly
argues that the “centrality of certain choices to personhood”
argument is not sufficient.
Paying closer attention to personal identity does not only offer
benefits within the context of intimate agreements. Narrative
identity also underlies the concept of moral agency, which makes it
relevant to aspects of contract doctrine that can be justified with
respect to it. The incapacity defense to contract formation, for
example, lacks a coherent explanation. The origins and current
justifications for the prohibition against enforcing a contract
against infants are far from clear.261 The defense based on mental
260. See Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 225, 227 (2011) (noting the reluctance of courts to
enforce contracts in an ongoing marriage); Matsumura, supra note 20, at 191–
94; Katherine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93
NW. U. L. REV. 65, 67 (1998) (noting that when parties to a marriage include
terms governing housework, sex, emotional support, and other non-financial
responsibilities in an agreement, “courts only enforce the provisions governing
money”).
261. At common law, individuals under age twenty-one could only incur
voidable contractual duties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14
cmt. a (1981). The coherent justification for this prohibition is difficult to find.
Modern scholars have generally explained a minor’s lack of contractual capacity
on the ground that below a certain age, minors lack maturity, competence, or the
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illness also admits a wide range of disparate proof.262 Because the
concept of narrative identity explains why it is morally problematic
to hold someone accountable for actions that the person is
incapable of placing within her self-narrative, it can help to
provide that doctrine with greater coherence.
Finally, the concept of narrative identity helps to focus
attention on the positive role that contract law plays in facilitating
the formation of the self. Margaret Jane Radin has argued that the
expectation of continuing control over property can enhance
personhood in the following respect: “If an object you now control
is bound up in your future plans or in your anticipation of your
future self, and it is partly these plans for your own continuity that
make you a person, then your personhood depends on the
realization of these expectations.”263 Expectations of oneself and
others regarding future action also allow people to set goals and
establish connections to their future selves. Although the benefits
of contracting are often described only in economic or market
terms, contracts, just like property ownership, can reflect important
personal commitments that affect a person’s sense of self and the
quality of his or her self-narrative.

ability to make self-interested decisions. See Vivian E. Hamilton, The Age of
Marital Capacity: Reconsidering Civil Recognition of Adolescent Marriage, 92
B.U. L. REV. 1817, 1851–52 (2012); Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction
of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 559–60 (2000). Narrative identity
theory also has the potential to refine the category of “minors” both in the
contract context and beyond. To the extent children who have committed crimes
are less able to create a coherent narrative, their ability to act in their own selfinterest would be diminished, as would their ability to place their later selves in
the same narrative as the one in which the crime occurred. Certain types of
punishments, like sentences of life without the possibility of parole, could
therefore be unwarranted from a moral standpoint. Cf. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.
Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012); Beth A. Colgan, Constitutional Line Drawing at the
Intersection of Childhood and Crime, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 79 (2013)
(discussing the Court’s inconsistent treatment of juveniles and the potential
effect of differences between children and adults on recognized penological
purposes).
262. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15, cmts. b, c (1981).
263. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,
968 (1982).

